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DEVELOPING STANDARDS UNDER
AMENDED RULE 11 OF THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE*
Edward D. Cavanagh**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure1 is designed to

ensure the integrity of pleadings and other papers filed in federal
district court. The rule was amended in 1983 in response to the

widely held perception that its provisions, as originally promulgated,
had proven ineffective in deterring strike suits, litigation abuses, and
lawsuits used as instruments of delay and oppression.2 Amended
* The author gratefully acknowledges the very helpful suggestions on this Article by
Professors Jeff Sovern and Ettie Ward, the research assistance of Mr. Timothy S.J.
McCausland, and the staff of the St. John's Law Review.
** Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. J.D., Cornell Law School,
1974; LL.M., Columbia Law School, 1986,
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 1I provides:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney
shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose
address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his
pleading, motion, or other paper and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied
by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer under oath must be
overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that
to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is
not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other
paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or
other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both,
an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or
parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the
pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
2. FED. R. Civ. P. I I advisory committee's note. Cf. Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv.,
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Rule 11 introduces more stringent standards designed to make attorneys stop and think 3 about their legal obligations before signing
pleadings and motions. These obligations are reinforced by imposing
mandatory sanctions upon violation of the standards.' The drafters
had a twofold purpose in amending Rule 11: (1) to deter dilatory or
abusive behavior; and (2) to streamline litigation.5 In addition, the
new Rule 11 is aimed at increasing a judge's willingness to hold attorneys accountable for their misconduct by encouraging courts to
impose sanctions.6 Once a violation of Rule 11 has been found, sancInc., 596 F. Supp. 13, 16 (N.D. III. 1984) (Rule I1 amended to curb filing of complaints and
other papers lacking a proper foundation in law and fact), afl'd, 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985);
Day v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 595 F. Supp. 1120, 1122 (S.D. Tex.), appeal dismissed, 747
F.2d 1462 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1086 (1985) (Rule 11 amended to eliminate
confusion among district courts as to when sanctions should be imposed); Pudlo v. IRS, 587 F.
Supp. 1010, 1011 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (attorney's fees rarely awarded under old Rule I1). See
Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New FederalRule II - A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181,
182 (1985):
The growing cost, complexity and burdensomeness of civil litigation has been a
serious concern to judges, lawyers and the public. There is no single cause nor is
there a single remedy for this problem. But there is considerable opinion, supported
by at least anecdotal evidence, that misuse and abuse of the litigation process have
contributed to the problem. Resort to frivolous litigation, maintenance of baseless
defenses, and harassment of one's opponent are practices that judges and lawyers
engaged in civil litigation encounter regularly.
See generally 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER. FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §1334 (1969)
("there is little evidence of frequent use of sanctions for the violation of Rule I1"); Rothschild,
Fenton & Swanson, Rule 11: Stop. Think, and Investigate, 11 LITIGATION 13 (1985); Note,
Plausible Pleadings: Developing Standardsfor Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 HARV. L. REv. 630,
631 (1987) (concern that the existing mechanisms did not sufficiently screen frivolous claims
prompted the 1983 amendments to Rule 11); Comment, Courts Are No Placefor Fun and
Frivolity: A Warning To Vexatious Litigants and Over-Zealous Attorneys, 20 WILLAMETrE
L.J. 441, 465-66 (1984) (effect of amended Rule 11 will be to lessen frivolous claims); Miller
& Culp, Litigation Costs, Delay Prompted the New Rules of Civil Procedure,Nat'l L.J., Nov.
28, 1983, at 24, col. 1 (overview as to why Rule II was amended).
3. Marcus, Reducing Court Costs and Delay: The Potential Impact of the Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 66 JUDICATURE 363, 364 (1983).
4. FED, R. Civ. P. I1 advisory committee's note. See, e.g., Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City
of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985) (sanctions imposed when claim has "no
chance of success"); Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., Inc., 596 F. Supp. 13, 22 (N.D. Ill.
1984) (finding of subjective bad faith not necessary under amended Rule 11), aff'd, 771 F.2d
194 (7th Cir. 1985). See also Miller & Culp, supra note 2, at 34, col. 1; Sussman & Sussman,
Decisions Under Amended Rule II Require Care, Legal Times of N.Y., June 1984, at 6, col.
I (purpose of amendment is to prevent abuse by permitting courts to award expenses to litigants); Sussman, Changes in Federal Rules Create Risks, Opportunities, Legal Times, Sept.
19, 1983, at 34, col. 1 (judges required to impose sanctions for violations of Rule 11
standards).
5. Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1536 (9th Cir.
1986).
6. See FED. R. Civ. P. II advisory committee's note.
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tions are mandatory. Judges, however, have broad discretion in

choosing the appropriate penalty and are explicitly authorized to
award attorney's fees to the abused party.7
The topic of sanctions is unpleasant for judges and attorneys
alike." Sanctions escalate tensions among litigants, undermine collegiality among members of the bar, and create hostility between
bench and bar. Perceived abuses by litigants and their attorneys,
however, have led some courts and Congress to place greater reliance
on sanctions as a mechanism for improving litigation within the federal system. Nevertheless, the net utility of widespread imposition of
sanctions remains the subject of intense debate among scholars. 9 For
the time being, the sanctions advocates, with the promulgation of
amended Rule 11, are having their way.

Indeed, the reported decisions to date under Rule 11 reflect the
drafters' intent to curb litigation abuses by sanctions, 10 and because
many sanctions decisions go unreported, these reported cases represent only the "tip of the iceberg."1 While sanctions may be effective in limiting delay and abusive practices, the expansive use of
sanctions may create several undesirable side effects. First, greater
utilization of sanctions threatens to chill creativity in advocacy and
thereby to impede the traditional ability of the common law to adjust to changing situations.

Second, sanctions practice is likely to

7. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note. The 1983 amendments to the Federal
Rules gave increased emphasis to sanctions and cost-shifting as a means of controlling litigation abuse. Attorneys should expect that the courts will, in appropriate cases, impose sanctions,
which may include dismissal of a claim or defense or a default judgment. In addition to the
nonmonetary sanctions available under the Rules, it may be appropriate for the courts to shift
the cost of improper tactics to the abusing party. See Revised Report of the Special Committee on Effective Discovery in Civil Casesfor the Eastern District of New York to the Honorable Jack B. Weinstein, ChiefJudge, 102 F.R.D. 357, 391-94 (1984) [hereinafter Eastern District Report].
8. Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1271 (2d Cir. 1986).
9. See, e.g., Lewin, A Legal Curb Raises Hackles, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1986, at DI,
col. 4. This article briefly summarizes the debate between the anti-sanctions school led by
Chief Judge Jack B. Weinstein (sanctions "have become another way of harassing the opponent and delaying the case") and sanctions proponents such as Arthur Miller ("Rule 11 is a
useful weapon against unnecessary litigation").
10. Lewin, supra note 9. For an analysis of the impact of sanctions under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 11, see Sanctions: Rule 11 and Other Powers, Section of Litigation, ABA (1986). For a listing of district court cases involving Rule I1 sanctions
from August 1, 1983 through August 1, 1985, see Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Rule 11
- Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74
GEo. L.J. 1313, 1354-69 (1986).
1I. Lewin, supra note 9, at D8, col. 4.
12. Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1536 (9th Cir.
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generate expensive and time consuming satellite litigation, which obscures the real controversy between the litigants."3 Third, imposing
mandatory sanctions where difficult legal issues are involved increases the likelihood of arbitrariness and decreases the probability
of uniform enforcement of Rule 11.14 Fourth, addition of Rule 11
sanctions to the existing sources of judicial sanctioning power threatens to muddy further an area of law which has been neither clearly
articulated nor consistently applied.15
As decisions begin to percolate to the circuit court level, clarity
and consistency in the application of Rule 11 sanctions have yet to
emerge. This Article proposes to: (1) summarize the bases for imposition of sanctions prior to the promulgation of amended Rule 11;11
(2) review and analyze amended Rule 11 and the emerging case law
thereunder; 17 and (3) attempt to fashion clear and consistent standards to serve as a guide for both courts and practitioners on Rule
11 issues. 18
II. REMEDYING ABUSIVE LITIGATION TACTICS PRIOR TO THE

1983

AMENDMENTS

Traditionally, courts have used three separate grounds to attack
abusive litigation tactics: (1) Rule 11; (2) the inherent equitable
powers of the court to police the conduct of attorneys appearing
before it; 19 and (3) various federal statutes which award attorney's
fees to prevailing parties 20 or tax costs and attorney's fees against
counsel who have conducted proceedings in a vexatious manner.21
Although the power to police the conduct of attorneys appearing
before a court is theoretically separate from the power to shift fees
and costs, the two concepts have become inextricably intertwined,
and fee shifting is the most common sanction imposed by the courts.
Nevertheless, none of these devices was particularly effective in
stemming frivolous suits or abusive litigation tactics prior to the
1986); Nelken, supra note 10, at 1338-42.
13. Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d at 1557; Rosenberg, The
Federal Civil Rules After Half A Century, 36 ME. L. REV. 243, 244 (1984).
14. Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d at 1541.
15. Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1271 (2d Cir. 1986).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 25-76.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 77-265.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 266-322.
19. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
20. See Note, Awards of Attorney's Fees in the Federal Courts, 56 ST. JOHN's L. REv.
277, 287 n.34 (1982).

21.

See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982).
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adoption of the 1983 amendments. 2

A.

Rule 11 as Originally Promulgated

Old Rule 11 was designed specifically to assure the integrity of
pleadings filed in federal court 23 by requiring that each pleading be
signed by an attorney 4 By signing the pleading the attorney certified that: (1) he had read the document; (2) to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief, there was "good ground" to support it;
and (3) the submission was not interposed for delay.25 The old Rule
gave courts broad discretion to remedy any violation of the certification requirement. Thus, a pleading signed with the intent to defeat
the purpose of the Rule could be stricken. 26 An attorney was subject
to disciplinary proceedings if a "wilful violation" 27 could be shown.
While old Rule 11 did not specifically address the issue of whether
imposition of attorney's fees constituted an "appropriate disciplinary
22. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
23. See 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 1333; Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

11, 61

MINN.

L.

REV.

1, 7-8 (1976).

Chief Justice Warren E. Burger described the signature requirement as follows: "When
the elder statesmen among you here today came to the bar, I am sure you were told, as I was,
that your signature on a pleading or motion was something like your signature on a check.
There was supposed to be something to back it up." Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., Inc.,
596 F. Supp. 13, 27 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (quoting Address by then Chief Justice Warren Burger,
American Law Institute Annual Meeting (May 15, 1984)), affd, 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir.
1985).
24. If a party is proceeding pro se, the party must sign the pleading. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
This provision appears in both old Rule I I and amended Rule 11.
25. Prior to 1983, Rule II read:
Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least
one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party
who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading and state his address.
Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not
be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an
answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one
witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an
attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the
best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it;
and that it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading is not signed or is signed with
intent to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be stricken as sham and false and
the action may proceed as though the pleading had not been served. For a wilful
violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar action may be taken if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. app. at 540-41 (1982).
26. Id.
27. Id.
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action, 28 it was well established that the old Rule empowered courts
to shift the cost of suit, including attorney's fees, to the abusing
29
party.
Sanctions under old Rule 11 were rarely imposed.30 The certification standards were too lenient; good faith on the part of the
pleader was all that was needed to avoid sanctions. In addition, the
key requirement that there be "good ground" to support the pleading

was ill-defined.3 1 The "good ground" standard affirmatively obligated the signing attorney to represent his honest belief that facts
and law existed to support the claims asserted in the pleading.3 2 The
precise nature of the attorney's responsibilities remained unclear. a3
For example, it was not apparent that the "good ground" language

necessitated a prefiling investigation by the attorney.3 4 Given this un28. Badillo v. Central Steel & Wire Co., 717 F.2d 1160, 1166 (7th Cir. 1983); Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 350 (2d Cir. 1980).
29. See Hedison Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 643 F.2d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 1981) (attorney's fees
assessed due to frivolous nature of contentions); Anderson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 630 F.2d 677,
684 (9th Cir. 1980) (sanctions imposed on plaintiff's attorney due to determination of abuse of
process). See also Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 350 (2d Cir. 1980) ("Assuming arguendo that an award of attorneys' fees is a permissible sanction under Rule 11, our conclusion
that the instant action was not without foundation and hence not commenced in bad faith
necessarily precludes the award of such fees under Rule 1I."). But cf. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 603 F.2d 100, 103 n.2 (9th Cir. 1979) ("Rule II of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure provides no authority for awarding attorney's fees against an unsuccessful litigant.
...The rule says nothing about disciplining a party by imposing attorney's fees upon him for
any act of his lawyer, even if his lawyer willfully violated Rule 11." emphasis added).
30. Indeed, as Kassin points out:
In a review of litigation activity from 1938 to 1976, it was found that rule I I motions had been filed in only nineteen reported cases. Among these cases, violations
were found in eleven instances, and attorneys were sanctioned in only three. Lest
these findings be dismissed as outdated, another report reviewed the relevant case
law through 1979 and found only one additional reported opinion in which counsel
was disciplined under rule 11.
S.M. KASSIN, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS 2 (Federal Judicial Center 1985)
(footnotes omitted). See also Mr. Frank, Inc., v. Waste Management, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 859,
870 (N.D. II1.
1984); Pudlo v. IRS, 587 F. Supp. 1010, 1011 (N.D. I11.
1984).
31. FED. R. Civ. P. II advisory committee's note.
32. See, e.g., Helfant v. Louisiana & S. Life Ins. Co., 82 F.R.D. 53, 56-57 (E.D.N.Y.
1979) (attorney has affirmative obligation to satisfy himself that there is good reason to support the claim).
33.

See 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 1333.

34. See Id. ("the cases do not make it clear to what extent an attorney must investigate
his client's case prior to signing" (footnote omitted)). But see Helfant v. Louisiana & S. Life
Ins. Co., 82 F.R.D. 53, 56-57 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (attorney has "an affirmative obligation that
he be satisfied in good faith that there is good reason to support the claim"). See also Kinee v.
Abraham Lincoln Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 365 F. Supp. 975, 982-83 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (plaintiffs' attorneys taxed with costs where improper prefiling investigation inconvenienced certain
dismissed parties).
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certainty, the courts were reluctant to impose sanctions.3 5
Under old Rule 11 disciplinary action was appropriate for an
attorney's willful violation of the rule.36 Establishing willful misconduct by an attorney necessitated a finding of subjective bad faith. a
The test for subjective bad faith was whether there was clear evidence that the claims in question were "entirely without color and
. . .asserted wantonly, for purposes of harassment or delay, or for

other improper reasons."38 A colorable claim needed "some legal and
factual support

. . .

in light of the reasonable beliefs of the individ-

ual making the claim."3 9 Thus, the test was "whether a reasonable
attorney could have concluded that facts supporting the claim might
be established, not whether such facts actually had been
40

established."
Apart from the nebulous standards of old Rule 11, courts were
reluctant to impose sanctions on members of the bar;41 when they
35. FED. R. Cv. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
36. FED. R. Civ. P. 11, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. app. at 540-41 (1982).
37. Miller & Culp, supra note 2, at 24, col. 4. See Browning Debenture Holders'
Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078, 1087-88 (2d Cir. 1977) (analysis of bad faith in
context of decision regarding whether or not to apply exception to American rule).
38. Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078, 1088 (2d Cir.
1977).
39. Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 348 (2d Cir. 1980). In Nemeroff, the court
faced the issue of the bad faith exception to the American rule, which governs the allocation of
litigation costs. The rule places the burden of counsel fees on each party, regardless of the
outcome of the suit.
40. Id. (emphasis in original).
41. See Schwarzer, supra note 2, at 183-84:
Reliance on sanctions as a remedy, however, raises a series of problems of
which lawyers and judges must be aware. First, lawyers are generally reluctant to
seek sanctions and judges to impose them. The process is unpleasant, adds to the
existing work, and increases the tensions in the courtroom. Lawyers may not want
to inhibit their own freedom by calling their opponents' practices into question.
Judges may be uneasy about appearing to assume the role of policeman, teacher or
moral guardian.
Second, judges may fear that initiating the process of imposing sanctions may
spawn satellite litigation, i.e. ancillary proceedings that may themselves assume the
dimensions of litigation with a life of its own. Indeed, an offending party seeking to
obstruct and delay litigation may welcome the resulting proliferation of proceedings
as serving his purposes.
Third, judges may also be chary about criticizing a lawyer's conduct out of
concern that they are or will be perceived as imposing their personal standards of
professionalism on others. The standards of the bar in these matters span a wide
spectrum, and just where the line lies between the acceptable and unacceptable is
not always clear.
Fourth, imposing sanctions on lawyers for their conduct of litigation raises the
spectre of chilling advocacy. The Advisory Committee states in its Notes that the
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did so, sanctions amounted to little more than a published opinion
reprimanding the offending attorney.42 Nor were courts eager to
strike pleadings, because to do so would be to punish the parties for
the mistakes of their attorneys.43 Given the minimal standards of
Rule 11, the heavy burden to prove violation, and the hesitancy of
judges to impose sanctions, the old Rule did not effectively deter
abuses of the litigation process."
rule "is not intended to chill an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal theories." Nevertheless lawyers can be expected to resist the imposition
of sanctions as penalizing them for discharging their duty to their clients, and
judges may be sensitive to that concern.
Id.
42. Miller & Culp, supra note 2, at 24, col. 4, 34, col. I. ("All things considered, former
Rule 11 needed change because it was plagued by low visibility, soft standards and was enforced by meaningless sanctions.").
43. Id. at 24, col. 4.
44. Kassin offers the following explanation for the ineffectiveness of the original Rule
11:
First, the courts had exhibited confusion over the standard of inquiry lawyers
were expected to satisfy (i.e., how thoroughly must they investigate a client's case
before signing the pleading?). Some judges defined the standard narrowly, viewing
attorney conduct as abusive only "when it appears beyond peradventure that it is
sham and false and that its allegations are devoid of factual basis." Others, however, adopted a broader interpretation, explicitly requiring lawyers to "ascertain
that a reasonable basis exists for the allegations, even if the allegations are made on
information and belief."
Second, the enforcement mechanism provided by rule I I was ambiguous and
difficult to translate into specific policy (i.e., when was a violation sanctionable, and
what disciplinary actions were then available?). To begin with, it was never clear
precisely what kinds of sanctions were considered appropriate. If a pleading violated
the requirements of rule I1, it could be stricken. Understandably, judges were reluctant to dispose of a client's case because of counsel's indiscretions. With regard to
attorney sanctions, assessing costs, reprimands, contempt citations, and disbarment
were possible reactions, but under what conditions? According to the rule, only
"willful" violations were to provoke such disciplinary responses. Because of the subjectivity of this standard and the difficulty of making judgments about lawyers' underlying motives and intentions, the courts were unclear about the conditions that
triggered the use of sanctions. Consequently, sanctions were rarely threatened or
imposed, and their availability apparently did not deter frivolous conduct.
Finally, a third explanation for the ineffectiveness of rule 11 should be added to
the list - judges, as a general rule, seem reluctant to impose attorney sanctions.
Section 1927 of title 28 of the U.S. Code, first enacted in 1813, provides for cost
shifting when a lawyer "multiplies the proceedings in any case as to increase costs
unreasonably and vexatiously." Yet, as with rule 11, relatively few courts have invoked this statute. In another, related context, several writers have observed the
same kind of infrequent use of sanctions under federal rule 37, which articulates
several types of disciplinary response to abusive pretrial discovery practices. As
early as 1958, it was argued that the judiciary did not vigorously employ its power
to elicit compliance with discovery guidelines. Today, research shows that even
though there is a consensus among lawyers that such sanctions are an effective but
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B.

Inherent Equitable Powers of the Court

The Supreme Court has recognized that the federal courts have
inherent equitable power to require a losing party to pay its adversary's attorney's fees when the losing party has acted oppressively,

vexatiously, or in bad faith in commencing or maintaining an action.4" Taxing attorney's fees under such circumstances presents an
exception to the so-called American rule which requires litigants to

bear responsibility for their own attorney's fees, irrespective of which
party ultimately succeeds, unless statutory or contractual authoriza-

tion provides otherwise. 46 Sanctions may be imposed against the losing party or its attorney. 47 Not only has the use of the court's inherent equitable powers been invoked infrequently, it also has been
limited to situations where counsel has either acted in bad faith,48 or
interposed a claim or defense without probable cause. 49 Like old
Rule 11, this doctrine shifts fees and costs only in egregious cases. 50
Thus, it has not been an effective deterrent to frivolous litigation.
underutilized means of control, judges are, for a variety of reasons, generally reluctant to use them. In short, at least part of the problem is attributable not to the
language of rule I I per se, but to judges' unwillingness to follow it.
S.M. KASSIN, supra note 30, at 3-4 (footnotes omitted). See FED. R. Civ. P. II advisory
committee's note.
45. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975); F.D.
Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974); Oliveri v.
Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1272 (2d Cir. 1986). See also Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447
U.S. 752, 765-66 (1980) (American rule does not apply when opposing party acted in bad
faith). Not all state courts share this inherent power. See, e.g., A.G. Ship Maintenance Corp.
v. Lezak, 69 N.Y.2d 1 (1986) (absent specific statute or court rule authorizing monetary sanctions, court would not impose them).
46. Note, supra note 20, at 278 n.2. In contrast to the American rule, the so-called
English rule permits the prevailing parties to recover the costs of suit, including reasonable
attorney's fees. Schwarzer, supra note 2, at 205. For a history of the English rule and the
American rule, see Note, supra note 20, at 278-79 nn.1-2.
47. See, e.g., Dow Chemical Pacific, Ltd. v. Rascator Maritime, S.A., 782 F.2d 329, 344
(2d Cir. 1986) (award made against party will be upheld upon showing of bad faith); Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 80-81 (2d Cir. 1982) (award made against attorney will be
upheld upon clear evidence of bad faith or vexatiousness), cert. denied sub nom. Lewy v.
Weinberger, 464 U.S. 818 (1983).
48. The term "bad faith" has been narrowly defined. See Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d.
1265, 1272 (2d Cir. 1986).
49. Tedeschi v. Smith Barney, Harris Upman & Co., 757 F.2d 465, 466 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Chapman v. Smith Barney, Harris Upman & Co., 106 S. Ct. 147 (1985);
Day v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 595 F. Supp. 1120, 1122 (S.D. Tex.), appeal dismissed, 747
F.2d 1462 (5th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 470 U.S. 1086 (1985). See also Roadway Express,
Inc., v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-65 (1980) (inherent powers must be used with restraint
because they are beyond "direct democratic controls").
50. See Badillo v. Central Steel & Wire Co., 717 F.2d 1160, 1165 (7th Cir. 1983).
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Statutory Bases

In addition to Rule 11 and the inherent equitable powers of the
courts, various federal statutes carve out exceptions to the American
rule and permit attorney's fees to be shifted to the losing party in
cases where the litigation is found frivolous or is conducted in a vexatious manner.5 1 Among the most important of these statutes is section 1927 of Title 28 of the United States Code,52 "the thrust of
which is 'to curb dilatory practices and the abuse of the court
processes by attorneys.' ,,53 Under this statute, an attorney may be
held personally liable for an adversary's legal fees when his conduct
in representing either plaintiff or defendant "multiplies the proceedings. . . unreasonably and vexatiously.1 54 Since section 1927 specifically provides that the offending lawyer, not the client, be taxed
with the adversary's attorney's fees, the remedy it provides differs
from both fee shifting under Rule 1155 and fee shifting based on the
court's inherent equitable powers.56 As originally enacted, the statute
permitted the costs of a lawsuit to be borne by an attorney but did
not specifically address attorney's fees. 5 7 It was amended in 1980,
however, to include the award of attorney's fees reasonably incurred
by vexatious conduct.58 The party seeking fees must clearly prove
bad faith and vexatious multiplication of proceedings.5 9 As is the
51. For a survey of federal statutes permitting awards of attorney's fees to the prevailing
parties, see Note, supra note 20, at 287-88 n.34.
52, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982) provides in full:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the
United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case
unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the

excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such
conduct.
Id.
53. Tedeschi v. Smith Barney, Harris Upman & Co., 579 F. Supp. 657, 661 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (quoting Colucci v. New York Times Co., 533 F. Supp. 1011, 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)),
affd, 757 F.2d 465 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Chapman v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham
& Co., 106 S. Ct. 147 (1985).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982).
55. FED. R. Ov. P. 1I. The fact that the statute specifically provides that an adversary's
legal fees will be taxed to the attorney rather than to the client may make courts even more
reluctant to impose sanctions under this statute than they would be under Rule II or their
inherent equitable powers. See supra note 41.
56. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766-67 (1980).
57. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1927, 62 Stat. 869, 957 (amended 1980).
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982).
59. Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265 (2d Cir. 1986); Day v. Amoco Chems. Corp.,
595 F. Supp. 1120, 1123 (S.D. Tex.), appeal dismissed, 747 F.2d 1462 (5th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1086 (1985). See also West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079,
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case with awards made pursuant to the court's inherent power,

awards under section 1927 are proper where the "attorney's actions
are so completely without merit

. . .

that they must have been un-

dertaken for some improper purpose such as delay." 0 The standards
for proving bad faith under section 1927 and under the inherent
powers rule are thus the same."' The key difference is that awards
are taxable only against the offending attorney under section 1927,

while an award made under the court's inherent power may be made
against an attorney, a party, or both. 2 Since courts view section
1927 as penal in nature, it has been strictly construed 63 and rarely
invoked. 4
Prevailing parties are permitted to recover reasonable attorney's

fees under other federal statutes, particularly civil rights statutes. 5
Such statutes generally have a dual purpose: (1) to compensate
plaintiffs for the cost of enforcing legal rights as "private attorneys
general" implementing important public policies; and (2) to deter
baseless claims or defenses and compensate the victims of such
claims or defenses for costs which they never should have incurred. 8
Although a detailed discussion of these statutes exceeds the scope of

this Article, the statutes and cases have drawn a distinction between
the rights of a prevailing plaintiff and the rights of a prevailing defendant to recover attorney's fees. 7 For example, although the
strong policy considerations that militate in favor of permitting a
prevailing civil rights plaintiff routinely to recover counsel fees are
1092 (2d Cir.) (28 U.S.C. § 1927 provides that a court may award double costs and damages
in cases of "frivolous and vexatious appeals;" however, such an award requires "a clear showing of bad faith"), cert. denied sub nom. Cotler Drugs, Inc. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 404 U.S.
871 (1971).
60. Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1273 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing Acevedo v. INS,
538 F.2d 918, 920 (2d Cir. 1976)).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Badillo v. Central Steel & Wire Co., 717 F.2d 1160, 1166 (7th Cir. 1983).
64. S.M. KASSIN, supra, note 30, at 4. See Note, Sanctions Imposed by Courts on Attorneys Who Abuse the Judicial Process, 44 U. Cni. L. REv. 619, 623-29 (1977).
65. Note, supra note 20, at 287 n.34. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) (civil rights
actions); Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 204(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1982).
66. Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 563 (E.D.N.Y.
1986).
67. Thus, for example, under the antitrust laws, only prevailing plaintiffs may recover
attorney's fees. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982). Under the patent laws, however, attorney's fees may
be awarded to the prevailing party. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1982). Nevertheless, even where fees are
authorized for the prevailing party, the courts may apply different standards to plaintiffs and
defendants. See infra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1986

11

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 2
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:499

not applicable where the defendant prevails,68 courts have permitted
successful defendants in civil rights actions to recover fees in limited
circumstances. 9 A victorious defendant in a Title VII case may recover counsel fees when the action is found to be "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith." 70° A victorious plaintiff in a Title II case, on the other
hand, will recover attorney's fees "unless special circumstances
would render such an award unjust.17 1 Courts have been liberal in
permitting prevailing civil rights plaintiffs to recover attorney's
fees.7 2 In enforcing the civil rights laws, plaintiffs are acting as private attorneys general, and this conduct "is to be encouraged by liberal compensation. '7 3 The more rigorous standard applicable to prevailing defendants is designed to assure that plaintiffs with arguably
meritorious claims will not be deterred from bringing suits by the
specter of having to pay enormous attorney's fees if the action proves
unsuccessful. 4 At the same time, permitting defendants to recover
counsel fees in the very limited circumstances described above protects them from patently baseless and burdensome litigation. 5
Whereas the statutory provisions permitting recovery of fees by preprevailvailing plaintiffs are designed to compensate, those 7favoring
6
ing defendants are principally aimed at deterrence.
In sum, prior to the 1983 amendments to Rule 11, regardless of
whether one proceeded under Rule 11, the court's equitable powers,
or a federal statute, the standards for shifting costs of abusive litigation tactics to the abusing party were severe and presented formidable hurdles. As a result, none of these bases of attack proved effective in deterring improper conduct by litigants.
68. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 418-19 (1978).
69. See, e.g., Carrion v. Yeshiva University, 535 F.2d 722, 727 (2d Cir. 1976) (defendant should be permitted to recover counsel fees "only where the action brought is found to be
unreasonable, frivolous, meritless or vexatious").
70. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978).
71. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
72. Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 564 (E.D.N.Y.
1986).
73. Id.
74. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978); Note, supra
note 20, at 301-02 (policy considerations underlying award of attorney's fees to prevailing
plaintiff in civil rights action are inapplicable to prevailing defendant).
75. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978); Steinberg v.
St. Regis/Sheraton Hotel, 583 F. Supp. 421, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
76. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 418-22 (1978).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol14/iss3/2

12

Cavanagh: Developing Standards Under Amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules o
STANDARDS UNDER AMENDED RULE 11

1986]

III.

AMENDED RULE 11
A.

Standards

In an effort to curtail frivolous claims, defenses, and motions
more effectively, to foster judicial economy, and to prevent delay in
litigating legitimate matters, a revised Rule 11 was promulgated on

April 28, 1983.7 The amended Rule introduces more stringent standards for pleadings, 78 and explicitly extends the attorney's certifica-

tion requirement to all papers filed with the court, including motions.7 9 It also mandates imposition of sanctions for violation of the
certification procedures.80 Furthermore, the substantive certification

requirements have been expanded to impose greater obligations upon
attorneys. 81 By signing a pleading, motion, or other filing, an attor-

ney certifies
that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the
best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing
law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation. 82

Under amended Rule 11, the attorney now has an affirmative
obligation to make some prefiling inquiry with respect to both the

facts and the law.83 "The standard is one of reasonableness under
the circumstances," 84 determined by investigation of the following
factors: (1) the time available for investigation; (2) whether the attorney had to rely on the client for information regarding the under77. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note. See Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v.
Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1536 (9th Cir. 1986); Marcus, supra note 3; Note, Reasonable Inquiry Under Rule 11 - Is The Stop, Look, and Investigate Requirement A Litigants'
Roadblock?, 18 IND. L. REV. 751, 773 (1985).
78. Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor of Baltimore, 775 F.2d 177, 181 (7th Cir. 1985).
79. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Note, however, that the provisions of Rule 11 had "always applied to motions and other papers by virtue of incorporation by reference in Rule 7(b)(2)."
FED. R. Civ. P. II advisory committee's note. This was made explicit by the amendment to
Rule II and the addition of Rule 7(b)(3). Id.
80. FED. R. Civ. P. 1I advisory committee's note.
81. Id.
82. FED. R. Civ. P. 1I.
83. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note. See Miller & Culp, supra note 2, at
34, col. 1.
84. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note; In re Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1182
(9th Cir. 1986).
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lying facts; (3) whether the filing was based on "a plausible view of
the law"; or (4) whether the attorney depended on forwarding counsel or another member of the bar.85 If the sufficiency of pretrial inquiry is at issue, neither the attorneys nor the parties are required to
divulge privileged communications or work-product.8 6 Where necessary, in camera proceedings will be used to protect work-product and
privileged materials.8 7 Courts are cautioned to avoid using hindsight
in measuring the reasonableness of an attorney's certification; rather,
reasonableness should be determined by examining what was appropriate at the time the pleading was filed. 8
In addition, the "good ground" language of old Rule 11 has
been expanded and made more explicit. 89 The claim or defense must
have a basis in fact, and must be warranted by existing law or a
good faith argument for a change in existing law. 90 It is not enough
that an attorney believes in his client's cause or that there is theoretical justification for the claim. 9 ' The new language is not meant to
"chill an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity," 92 but the new standard is intended to be more demanding than the prior test of subjective good faith.93 A greater range of circumstances may precipitate a
violation. 94 Amended Rule 11 standards apply equally to pro se
plaintiffs, although courts have discretion to take into account spe85. FED. R. Civ. P. II advisory committee's note.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. FeD. R. Civ. P. I1.
91. See Fisher v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 228, 235-36 (W.D. Mo. 1984); Address
by Senator Howell T. Heflin, 44th Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit,
100 F.R.D. 109, 205 (1983) (amended Rule 11 "provides that the attorney's belief in the
validity of the filing must have been formed after reasonable inquiry, and cannot simply represent loyalty to the client or wishful thinking").
92. FED. R. Civ. P. I I advisory committee's note.
93. See Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir. 1985)
("subjective good faith no longer provides the safe harbor it once did"); SFM Corp. v. Sundstrand Corp., 102 F.R.D. 555, 557 (N.D. III. 1984) ("[counsel's] subjective belief is not the
standard for determining the propriety of Rule I I sanctions"); Wells v. Oppenheimer & Co.,
Inc., 101 F.R.D. 358, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (Rule I I sanctions are appropriate where "there is
no objective basis for an attorney's belief that a motion is 'well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of
existing law'" (emphasis in original)), vacated on other grounds, 106 F.R.D. 258 (S.D.N.Y.
1985); Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 590 F. Supp. 852, 856 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (tone of
advisory committee's note and elimination of willfulness as a prerequisite to imposition of
sanctions indicates that courts need not find subjective bad faith before imposing sanctions),
rev'd on other grounds, 780 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986).
94. See Schwarzer, supra note 2, at 206.
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cial circumstances which may exist in such cases. 5
Equally significant is that amended Rule 11 prohibits filings
made for any improper purpose, not merely those made to cause delay." Thus, motion papers designed to harass and increase
the ad7
versary's litigation expenses are specifically prohibited.
B. Remedies
In line with other 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 98 amended Rule 11 contains a heightened emphasis
on sanctions as a mechanism for deterring abusive litigation tactics.
In order to dispel the perceived judicial reluctance to impose sanctions and to eliminate any apprehension on the part of litigants that
efforts to enforce Rule 11 will be futile, sanctions under amended
Rule 11 are mandatory. 9 Once a violation of Rule 11 is established,
courts are given broad discretion in choosing a suitable sanction, and
are explicitly authorized to shift the cost of the infraction, including
attorney's fees, to the abusing party.°10 Moreover, when appropriate,
sanctions may be imposed exclusively on the attorney and not on the
client.101
Arguably, however, the remedies under amended Rule 11 have
been limited. Under old Rule 11, pleadings signed with intent to defeat the purpose of the Rule could be stricken, as could pleadings
with scandalous or indecent materials.10 2 The amended Rule has
eliminated language specifically authorizing the striking of sham
95. FED. R. Civ. P. I1 advisory committee's note. See, e.g., Carbana v. Cruz, 595 F.
Supp. 585, 588 (D.P.R. 1984) (court took note of plaintiff's pro se status in deciding not to

impose additional attorney's fees on plaintiff for filing a groundless motion to disqualify the
judge from hearing defendant's application for attorney's fees), aff'd, 767 F.2d 905 (Ist Cir.
1985).
96. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. See Miller & Culp, supra note 2, at 34, col. 1.
97. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
98. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 16(0, 26(g).
99. FED. R. Civ. P. I I advisory committee's note. The mandatory nature of the Rule 11
sanctions provision was underscored by the court of appeals in Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City
of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 n.7 (2d Cir. 1985). See infra notes 252-57 and accompanying
text. But see Schwarzer, supra note 2, at 200:

It is not likely that courts will consider themselves bound by the rule's
mandatory language to impose sanctions. That the problems giving rise to the rule

may be urgent does not diminish the critical role of discretion in the exercise of
judicial power under the rule. The decision whether to impose sanctions and what

they should be will turn on an assessment of the gravity of the conduct at issue.
100.
101.
102.

FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
Id.
See supra note 25.
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pleadings.' 0 3 While this deletion has been criticized,10 4 motions to
strike may be better dealt with under Rules 8, 12, or 56.105 In any
event, courts clearly have power to tailor sanctions to a particular
violation, 106 and striking a pleading may well be an appropriate remedy in some cases.
IV.

ISSUES RAISED BY AMENDED RULE 11

While Rule 11, as amended, is intended to create a higher standard of behavior for attorneys, the new criteria for attorney conduct
are somewhat amorphous and therefore may "chill an attorney's en10°7
Of
thusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal theories.
even greater importance, however, is the real danger that fear of
sanctions will deter litigants from prosecuting claims long recognized
as legitimate because of a paucity of precomplaint data.10 8 In applying amended Rule 11, courts must be discerning in evaluating cases,
and should take precautions to avoid overinclusive, heavy-handed approaches which would undercut the policies of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.1 09
This section examines the standards which have emerged under
amended Rule 11 since its adoption in 1983. The discussion focuses
on judicial attitudes toward the new Rule as ascertained through the
103. FED. R. Civ. P. II advisory committee's note.
104. Lerner & Schwartz, Why Rule II Shouldn't Be Changed, Nat' L.J., May 9, 1983,
at 13, col. I.
105. FED. R. Civ. P. I1 advisory committee's note.
106. Id.; Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 n.7 (2d Cir.
1985) ("district courts retain broad discretion in fashioning sanctions"). See generally
Schwarzer, supra note 2, at 201-04 (reviewing the types of sanctions available to the court).
107. FED. R. Civ. P. II advisory committee's note. See Sussman, supra note 4, at 34
(the Rule I I standard of reasonableness under the circumstances is "less-than-illuminating").
108. This is precisely the kind of result the Federal-Rules were intended to avoid. The
basic thrust of the Federal Rules is that a meritorious claimant is entitled to his day in court
and ought not be derailed by technical pleading requirements. See 5 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, supra note 2, § 1202. To this end, "fact" pleading was abolished in favor of "a short
and plain statement of the claim." FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The plaintiff's complaint can be
fleshed out during discovery. 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 1202. There was no
requirement that the litigant be prepared to try the case before filing the complaint. Indeed, if
there is any basis upon which a plaintiff might recover, the complaint cannot be dismissed. See
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957). An overly literal interpretation of Rule 11
threatens to undo some of the most significant and enlightened reforms introduced by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
109. Judge Schwarzer has recommended that the decision on whether to impose sanctions and the nature of the sanctions should turn on an assessment of the gravity of the conduct in question. Schwarzer, supra note 2, at 200. In making that assessment, courts should
(1)avoid making post hoe judgments; (2) consider the impact of the violation; and (3) take
into account the need for punishment and deterrence. Id. at 200-01.
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empirical study of Rule 11 sanctions conducted under the aegis of
the Federal Judicial Center,110 and as evidenced through reported
decisions.
A.

The Federal Judicial Center Study

In order to determine whether the courts were adopting more
stringent standards for pleadings and motions in accordance with the
design of amended Rule 11, the Federal Judicial Center conducted
an empirical study focusing on the way federal judges interpret and
apply the new provisions of that rule.' Among other things, the
participating judges were asked to read one of ten case summaries,
each adapted from published opinions involving Rule 11 issues, and
to complete a questionnaire indicating whether a willful violation of
Rule 11 had occurred, and whether the offending party should be
required to pay attorney's fees."' The judges were also asked questions regarding the offending attorney's motives, the sufficiency of
prefiling inquiries, the reasons for imposing sanctions, and their
thoughts on how fellow judges would rule on the same issues." 3
Overall, the findings demonstrate an increased willingness on the
part of judges to impose sanctions for Rule 11 violations." 4 The
data, however, also indicate significant differences among judges as
to what constitutes a violation of Rule 11, and hence yield no consensus rationale for the imposition of sanctions.1 "'
Moreover, the study indicates that many judges appear willing
to consider subjective factors in determining whether Rule 11 has
been violated, notwithstanding the irrelevance of subjective factors
under the Rule as amended." 6 Thus, a significant percentage of participating judges would not impose sanctions where a party acted in
good faith, provided the conduct in question did not amount to a
willful violation of Rule 11.111 Where the violation was found to have
been willful, however, sanctions would normally be imposed even if
110. The Federal Judicial Center was created by Congress to conduct and to stimulate
research and development on matters of judicial administration. The Chief Justice of the
United States serves as Chairman of the Board of the Federal Judicial Center.
111. See generally S.M. KASSIN. supra note 30.
112. Id. at ix.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 45.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 18-29.

117.

Id. at 19-23.
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the party did act in good faith.118 The judges surveyed are thus less
inclined to view an instance of misconduct as evidencing bad faith
than as evidencing willful violation. 119 Unlike the advisory committee
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, these judges do not view the
terms "willful" and "bad faith" as synonymous. 120 Hence, many
judges have chosen to eschew the objective "reasonable inquiry"
standard of Rule 11 in favor of more subjective criteria, but at the
same time do not define the critical elements of any subjective test
with uniformity. Judges tend to sanction negligence or laziness more
frequently than they do incompetence or inexperience, even though
none of these terms would suggest bad faith. 21
The data further indicate that judges take into account whether
the conduct in question involves counsel or a pro se litigant.1 22 Although the judges viewed a particular action as a Rule 11 violation
irrespective of whether counsel was involved, they were less likely to
infer subjective bad faith where a party was proceeding pro se.12 3
Furthermore, judges tended to impose less weighty sanctions on pro
se litigants than on counsel. 24
B. Key Rule 11 Issues and the Courts
The reported decisions dealing with amended Rule 11 do not
comprise the entire universe of Rule 11 sanctions decisions, and may
represent only the tip of the iceberg. Since judges have traditionally
been reluctant to publicize the imposition of sanctions on attorneys,
many sanctions rulings remain unpublished.1 25 These unreported de26
cisions nevertheless have an impact on the bar.1
The most troublesome concerns under amended Rule 11 are: (1)
the undefined scope of the prefiling inquiry requirement; (2) the
standards for determining when a pleading is "well grounded in fact
and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
118. Id. at 22-23.
119. Id. at 22.
120. Id. at 23.
121. Id. at 27.
122. Id. at 41-43.
123. Id. at 42.
124. Id. at 43.
125. Some courts have a nonpublication policy and will not publish decisions which are
not precendential, thereby shielding sanctioned attorneys from public embarrassment. Simon,
More Penalties Seen for Litigation Abuses, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 22, 1983, at 26, col. 4 (specifically referring to the Ninth Circuit).
126. For example, outside of major metropolitan areas, word of sanctions decisions tends
to spread rapidly by word of mouth.
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extension, modification, or reversal of existing law"; (3) the impact
of the certification requirement on summary judgment motions made
to obtain discovery; (4) the possibility that that Rule's renewed emphasis on sanctions will prove counter-productive and bog the courts
down with expensive and time-consuming satellite litigation; and (5)
the scope of appellate review of a district court's sanctions order.
1. Prefiling Inquiry. -

a.

Inquiry into facts. -

While

amended Rule 11 clearly requires some investigation as to both the
facts and law prior to the filing of a pleading, it does not specify how
comprehensive an investigation must be in order to meet this requirement. 127 The suggestion in the advisory committee notes is to
use a sliding scale standard of "reasonableness under the circumstances. ' 128 Thus, Rule 11 does not mandate that prefiling factual
inquiries be the best possible under the circumstances, but only that
the inquiries be reasonable. This standard provides little guidance to
the bench and bar. Moreover, the factors that the advisory committee suggests as germane 29 do not adequately clarify the precise nature of an attorney's obligations under the Rule. For example, the
advisory committee notes imply that attorneys should not limit their
prefiling inquiries to the client;s apparently, however, attorneys
may rely solely on their clients if they have no other reasonable
1 31
alternative.
Although the Rule clearly does not require that an attorney be
prepared to try a case prior to filing the complaint,1 3 2 it makes no
attempt to indicate what steps, short of full-scale trial preparation,
constitute compliance. Such vagueness may have been intentional so
that practitioners might aspire to higher than prescribed minimum
standards. While raising the standards of practice by attorneys is a
desirable goal, a nebulous criterion for determining the sufficiency of
prefiling inquiry is not the appropriate vehicle for accomplishing that
goal. Such vagueness may deter legitimate actions where little information is available prior to suit. 133 In gender-based discrimination
127.

See Sussman & Sussman, supra note 4, at 36, col. 3.

128.

FED.

129.
131.

See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
See id.; Marcus, supra note 3, at 365.

132.

See supra note 108 and accompanyini text.

130.

R. Civ. P. I1 advisory committee's note.

133. This is not to suggest that the Federal Rules should be drafted and read rigidly; on
the contrary, the courts ought to have flexibility under Rule 11. Indeed, it is not unusual for

Congress to enact broad statutes and then permit the courts to work out the details on a case
by case basis. In Rule 11 matters, however, the stakes for attorneys and their clients are sim-
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cases, for example, the plaintiff's case is typically proved from information in the defendant's files which is not available for discovery
until after the action is filed. Fear of sanctions may discourage attorneys from pursuing these and similar cases where proof is largely
statistical.
One may argue that vagueness is not a competent basis for attacking this provision. The Federal Rules are replete with vague terminology. For instance, Rule 8(a) requires that a complaint contain
only a "short and plain statement of the claim." 13 4 Rule 56 permits
summary judgment where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. 135 It may be further argued that the drafters of Rule 11
intentionally employed vague terminology to provide the courts with
flexibility, enabling judges to develop clearer guidelines over time.
While flexibility has virtue in the context of pleading or summary
judgment, more certainty is desirable in the Rule 11 area because of
the severe adverse consequences that may follow a public rebuke by
the courts. A sanctioned attorney faces a loss of standing among colleagues at the bar and the loss of patronage by clients. It is therefore
necessary that the line delineating what is permitted from what is
proscribed be drawn with some precision.
The cases reported since amended Rule 11 became effective reveal that courts have not established definitive criteria as to when the
duty of "reasonable inquiry" has been discharged. 136 Recent cases,
however, have begun to define some of the contours of the "reasonable inquiry" test.137 First, it is clear that some prefiling inquiry is
ply too high to warrant case by case determinations; therefore, more certainty in the governing
standards is appropriate.
134. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
135.

FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

136. Many courts have simply concluded that, in light of the glaring deficiencies in the
plaintiff's complaint, the most minimal investigation by the attorney would have revealed that
his client's suit was groundless. See, e.g., Kuzmins v. Employee Transfer Corp., 587 F. Supp.
536, 538 (N.D. Ohio 1984); Steinberg v. St. Regis/Sheraton Hotel, 583 F. Supp. 421, 426
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); Van Berkel v. Fox Farm & Road Mach., 581 F. Supp. 1248, 1250-51 (D.
Minn. 1984); Viola Sportswear, Inc. v. Mimun, 574 F. Supp. 619, 621 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). See
also Smith v. United Transp. Union Local No. 81, 594 F. Supp. 96, 100-01 (S.D. Cal. 1984)
(defendants' counsel did not meet minimal standards of practice, since previously stricken affirmative defenses were raised in response to amended complaint).
137. Wold v. Minerals Eng'g Co., 575 F. Supp. 166, 167 (D. Colo. 1983). See AM Int'l,
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 39 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 433 (N.D. I11.1984), in which sanctions were
awarded where defendant's counsel implied that opposing counsel misrepresented the state of
health of a witness to be deposed based solely upon opposing counsel's rescheduling of the
deposition until three weeks later. Defendant's counsel failed to make reasonable inquiry as to
the factual basis of the charge by omitting questions of the witness at deposition as to whether
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necessary. 138 Where counsel has failed to make any inquiries, Rule
11 has been violated. 139 Thus, sanctions were imposed on an attorney
for filing an antitrust complaint where: (1) the primary basis for accusing the defendant of illegal conduct was the mere existence of a
prior antitrust action against the same defendant; and (2) where the
facts known to the attorney at the time of filing precluded a successful prosecution of the claim. 140 Similarly, sanctions were imposed on
an attorney for failure to elicit facts from an individual on deposition
that could have obviated subsequent claims by the attorney made on
behalf of his client.1 41 Thus, Rule 11 prohibits the use of form pleadings and "file now, discover later" tactics.
The harder questions on pretrial inquiry arise where some investigation has been made but the sufficiency of that investigation is
challenged. This, in turn, creates four separate issues to analyze: (1)
whether a pleading may be filed where the filing attorney is aware of
a clear, but waivable, defense such as statute of limitations or lack of
personal jurisdiction; (2) the extent to which an attorney must take
into account information furnished by the adversary; (3) the extent
to which the attorney may rely on the client for facts; and (4)
whether the prefiling investigation requirement invades the attorneyclient privilege or the attorney work-product doctrine.
(i) Pleading in the face of a waivable defense. - The application of Rule 11 sanctions in situations where plaintiff's counsel is
aware of the existence of a defense that is waivable raises difficult
questions. If an attorney is sanctionable under these circumstances,
then, in effect, the plaintiff is saddled with an additional burden
which previously was placed on the defendant. The plaintiff must, at
the pleading stage, negate possible defenses. On the other hand,
where the plaintiff files a claim in the face of a good defense, sanctions may be justified since this is arguably the type of litigation abuse Rule 11 was designed to eliminate. While some courts
have talked tough in this regard, 142 the decisions go both
opposing counsel encouraged him to use his health as an excuse to avoid being deposed. Id. at

435.
138.
139.
140.
268 (N.D.
141.

See cases cited supra note 136.
Id.
RPS Corp. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 166,
Ill. 1984), affid without opinion, 787 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1986).
AM Int'l, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 39 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 433 (N.D. Ill. 1984).

142. See Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253-54 (2d Cir.
1985) (Rule I1 is violated if claim has no chance of success); Schwarzer, supra note 2, at 193

(an attorney "cannot fail to disclose [an affirmative defense] in the hope that it will be
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ways. 143 The courts, however, have demonstrated a clear reluctance
to impose sanctions where the application of a defense is debatable.
Thus sanctions have been denied where the statute of limitations is a
viable defense but questions of tolling or fraudulent concealment are
in issue, 144 and where the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction exists but the defendant's minimum contacts with the forum are in issue.1 45 Judges seem less inhibited in imposing sanctions where the
defense is res judicata and the plaintiff appears to be instituting multiple actions for vexatious purposes. 146 Thus, the courts have imposed
sanctions only where violations are clear. A legal rule, however,
which would permit sanctions where a claim is interposed despite a
"clear" legal defense is unsatisfactory and may be difficult to administer. First, a clear defense to one judge may not be as clear to another, resulting in divergent standards. Second, this approach does
not address the fundamental problem raised at the outset: that imposition of sanctions on parties filing a claim in the face of a defense
thereto, in effect, saddles those parties with burdens heretofore
placed on defendants. Perhaps the way out of this thicket is a rule
which provides that sanctions will be imposed only after a defendant
has come forward with a clear defense, and the plaintiff continues to
prosecute the action notwithstanding the clear defense. 147 This approach is consonant with traditional assignments of the burdens of
pleading and will not significantly increase costs to defendants.
(ii) Information provided by the adversary. - Prior to the commencement of an action or shortly after the pleadings are filed, an
attorney may furnish the adversary with information which arguably
overlooked").
143. Sanctions were granted in Hasty v. Paccar, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 1577 (E.D. Mo.
1984) (personal jurisdiction lacking); Van Berkel v. Fox Farm & Road Mach., 581 F. Supp.
1248 (D. Minn. 1984) (statute of limitations). Sanctions were denied in Harris v. WGN ConDec. 18, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist.
tinental Broadcasting, No. 86 C 1772 (N.D. Ill.
file) (statue of limitations); Baker v. Wheat First Sec., 643 F. Supp. 1420 (S.D. W. Va. 1986)
(statute of limitations); Leema Enters., Inc. v. Willi, 582 F. Supp. 255, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)

(long-arm jurisdiction).
144. Harris v. WGN Continental Broadcasting, No. 86 C 1772 (N.D. Il.Dec. 18,
1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file); Baker v. Wheat First Sec., 645 F. Supp. 1420 (S.D.

W. Va. 1986).
145.

Leema Enters., Inc. v. Willi, 582 F. Supp. 255, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).

146. See e.g., Cannon v. Loyola University, 784 F.2d 777, 782 (7th Cir. 1986) (sanctions justified where pattern of repetitive litigation demonstrates a "penchant for harassing

defendants").
147. This was the case in Van Berkel v. Fox Farm & Road Mach., 581 F. Supp. 1248
(D. Minn. 1984), where plaintiff's counsel continued to prosecute a personal injury claim despite irrefutable documentary evidence that the claim was time-barred.
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vitiates a claim or defense. Where this exchange occurs, the question

presented is whether this information must be taken into account
under Rule 11. The cases make clear that an attorney is not free to

ignore information furnished by his adversary which contradicts his
client's contentions; such information at the very least puts counsel
on notice that further inquiry is needed.14 8 Consequently, failure to
make further inquiry may subject the attorney to sanctions." 49 Thus,
an attorney representing a plaintiff in a personal injury action was
sanctioned for failure to make reasonable inquiry for continued prosecution of a claim that was clearly barred by the statute of limita-

tions.150 The court further held that once an investigation reveals
that a client's position is untenable on the facts, the attorney has a

professional obligation to dismiss the action.151
On the other hand, an attorney is not required to disbelieve his
own client and to dismiss the case merely because an adversary disputes the client's claim. 5 2 Nor is extensive prefiling investigation required where the relevant events occurred long ago and witnesses

and documentation cannot readily be located. 5 3 Courts to date have

148. See Woodfork v. Gavin, 105 F.R.D. 100, 105 (N.D. Miss. 1985) (attorney under
Rule I I has the obligation continually to review client's position as new facts come to light);
Van Berkel v. Fox Farm & Road Mach., 581 F. Supp. 1248, 1250-51 (D. Minn. 1984) (uncontradicted evidence presented showing claim was barred by statute of limitations). But see
Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1274 (2d Cir. 1986) (Rule 11 does not impose a continuing obligation on counsel).
149. Van Berkel v. Fox Farm & Road Mach., 581 F. Supp. 1248 (D. Minn. 1984).
150. Id. at 1249-51. The record further indicated that: (1) the plaintiff had come to the
attorney some time prior to 1980; (2) the plaintiff's case had been docketed on the law firm's
computer in 1980, the attorney thereafter being periodically advised of the running of the
statute of limitations; and (3) therefore the attorney had adequate time to review the records
involved. Id. at 1250. Moreover, even if the attorney's failure to conduct a further investigation
was excusable, he had been alerted to the statute of limitations problem by the defendant's
answer raising that defense, and by the plaintiff's subsequent letter to him confirming that the
accident had occurred on the date contended by the defendant. Id. at 1250-51.
151. Id. at 1251. Plaintiff's counsel had argued that his ethical responsibility to his client precluded any voluntary dismissal. Rejecting this contention, the court reasoned that an
attorney has a professional obligation to dismiss a baseless claim, even over his client's objection, where he learns that such claim is baseless. Id.
152. Friedgood v. Axelrod, 593 F. Supp. 395, 397-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (sanctions denied
when defendant's previous disclosures were suspect and plaintiff's position was corroborated by
others). Thus, facts given by a client need not be undisputed, but they must be substantial
enough to support a reasonable belief that there is a basis to support the filing. Schwarzer,
supra note 2, at 187. Mere speculation, surmise, or rumor is not enough. Id.
153. Touchstone v. G.B.Q. Corp., 596 F. Supp. 805, 810 (E.D. La. 1984). However, the
court pointed out that "there comes a time after discovery has progressed that counsel should
have knowledge of the specific facts that would support the conclusion that the action is 'well
grounded in fact.'" Id.
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generally imposed sanctions only in cases where the most fundamental inquiries would have revealed impediments to the pleadings in
question. 154 The more complicated questions of sufficiency of the investigation arise where some prefiling inquiry has been made and the
investigation has been more than "minimal." This area, however, has
been left largely uncharted by the courts.
(iii) Reliance on the client. - From the foregoing discussion, a
fundamental principle emerges: an attorney may not rely solely on
the client where further investigation is reasonable. A leading case
on the appropriateness of relying on the client under Rule 11 is Kendrick v. Zanides.15 5 In Kendrick, the defendants, government prosecutors, sought sanctions following voluntary dismissal with prejudice
of civil rights claims.156 Plaintiff brought the civil rights action following his criminal conviction for securities fraud and perjury,
claiming that the federal prosecutors had impeded his defense
against the criminal charges by wrongfully searching and seizing
15
"7
files, removing documents, and concealing acts from the plaintiff.
Plaintiff's counsel conferred with the attorney who represented him
in prior proceedings; plaintiff's prior counsel confirmed "in general"
the facts set forth in the civil rights complaint.1 58 However, counsel
apparently did not, at the time of filing, review documents in the
plaintiff's possession which refuted the civil rights claims. 59 Only after the complaint had been filed and plaintiff's files reviewed did
counsel conclude that the claims were unprovable; he then dismissed
the action with prejudice.160
In imposing sanctions, the court found that while Rule 11 does
not mandate that plaintiff's attorneys conduct their own factual inquiry where another attorney has done so, the Rule does require that
the attorneys have sufficient credible information to enable them to
form a reasonable belief that the allegations in the complaint are
well grounded in fact.1 61 Thus, the opinions and conclusions of prior
counsel are insufficient to satisfy the present attorneys' duty of prefiling inquiry, particularly when the present attorneys had in their pos154.

See supra notes 141-51 and accompanying text.

155. 609 F. Supp. 1162 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 1164-65.
Id. at 1165.
Id. at 1172.

159.

Id.

160.
161.

Id.
Id.
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session documents refuting their client's claims.10 2 The court concluded that the action was pursued by plaintiff and his counsel to
"serve their vindictive purpose to damage the defendants' reputations
and subject them to personal harassment. 16 3
(iv) Prefiling inquiry and privilege. - Uncertainty as to what
constitutes the standards for prefiling investigation is not the only
problem with amended Rule 11. The question of how reasonable inquiry can be established without compromising either the attorneyclient privilege or the attorney work-product doctrine also arises. The
advisory committee notes provide that the Rule does not require disclosure of privileged communications or work-product to prove compliance with the certification standards.'6 This position begs the
question of what the proper procedures should be when there is a
need for such disclosure, such as when an attorney proceeds solely on
the basis of work product or client communications. 6 5 Such a problem might be illusory, however, since the information would have to
be disclosed eventually either in pleadings or during discovery, and
since disclosure of work-product or attorney-client matters may be
authorized in such circumstances.' 6
The advisory committee notes suggest that unauthorized disclosure can be prevented by use of in camera proceedings.16 7 This approach raises several unsettling possibilities. It provides an opportunity for ex parte communications, and therefore should be used only
as a last resort. 6" In addition, the judge who will ultimately decide
whether to impose sanctions under Rule 11 may demand access to
privileged materials. 6 9 Once aware of this possibility, clients may be
less than candid with their counsel, thwarting the basic purposes of
the attorney-client privilege. 1 0 The purported "protections" under
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Id. at 1173.
FED. R. Civ. P. I I advisory committee's note.
Marcus, supra note 3, at 365.

166.

See, e.g.

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Rule 1.6 (1983) (disclosure of

attorney-client discussion permitted when, for example, it is necessary to prevent a client from
committing a crime likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm, or to respond to allega-

tions in a proceeding concerning the attorney's representation of a client).
167.
168.
169.

FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
Schwarzer, supra note 2, at 199.
See Sussman, supra note 4, at 34, col. 4 ("The implications of this procedure re-

quire no elucidation.").
170. See Nelkin, supra note 10, at 1345 ("Clients will certainly become less forthright
as they learn of the varied circumstances in which rule 11 can drive a wedge between them
and their lawyers.").
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the new Rule may thus prove illusory. Potential privilege and workproduct problems under amended Rule 11 may merit additional attention by the drafters in order to provide guidance to the
practitioner.
b. Inquiry into law. - The amended Rule also requires prefiling inquiry with respect to the law.171 It is not enough that an attorney or party believes "the law is or should be a certain way. ' 172 As
with factual prefiling inquiries,17 3 courts have not articulated a minimum standard for the amount of legal research required prior to the
filing of pleadings under Rule 11, and the decisions in this area have
taken on a similar visceral quality.
Courts have imposed sanctions where parties, by amended
pleadings or subsequent actions, seek to interpose claims on legal
grounds which have previously been rejected by a court and are sup17 4
ported by arguments which do no more than rehash earlier briefs.
Similarly, attorneys may be sanctioned when they persist in pursuing
claims in the face of contrary, controlling, and indistinguishable authority brought to their attention by adversaries. 7 5 Courts are inclined to grant sanctions where a party seeks recovery on legal theories that have been uniformly rejected, and which contain no
colorable basis for distinguishing them from governing precedents.1 76
In Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Service, Inc., 7 for example, the
plaintiff brought a civil rights action against a towing company, several of its employees, and various municipal officials, asserting claims
"under virtually every conceivable theory" under the Bill of Rights
and the federal civil rights laws.17 Plaintiff's action followed his acquittal on charges of throwing paint on the towing company's building after his car had been towed from a private parking lot. 7 9 On
171. FED. R. Civ. P. I1.
172. Snyder v. IRS, 596 F. Supp. 240, 251 (N.D. Ind. 1984).
173. See supra notes 127-54 and accompanying text.
174. Smith v. United Transp. Union Local No. 81, 594 F. Supp. 96, 100-01 (S.D. Cal.
1984).
175. Id. at 101.
176. See, e.g., Sunn v. Dean, 597 F. Supp. 79, 83-84 (N.D. Ga. 1984), in which plaintiff's action was "patently frivolous" in alleging that jurors conspired to deprive him of his civil
rights, since jurors have absolute immunity from subsequent civil rights actions for damages.
See also Ring v. R.J. Reynolds Indus., Inc., 597 F. Supp. 1277, 1281-82 (N.D. I1. 1984)
(sanctions imposed where it was apparent that all four counts in plaintiff's complaint failed
under well-established law).
177. 596 F. Supp. 13 (N.D. Ill.
1984), affid, 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985).
178. Id. at is.
179. Id. at 16.
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defendant's motion, the trial court dismissed plaintiff's "ponderous,
extravagant, and overblown complaint that was largely devoid of a
colorable legal basis."1 80 Noting that amended Rule 11 required only
a "reasonable amount" of prefiling research, the trial court found a
"clear-cut violation" of the Rule and stated: "[W]ith even the modest research that is now required under rule 11, any lawyer admitted
to practice before this court quickly should have determined that this
relatively minor incident did not amount to a federal case of constiS8
tutional dimension." J
Thus, counsel is no longer free to "plead now and analyze
later.' 82 Nor is a "shotgun approach" to pleadings acceptable under
the amended Rule.' 83 While a lawyer may handle a number of cases
quickly by applying standard legal principles to each one, this approach is not permissible where one proffers a new theory or a theory
that cuts against much of the precedent. 8 Moreover, even where
counsel purports to have engaged in extensive prefiling research,
sanctions are appropriate if pleadings are "heavily freighted" with
claims having "no plausible legal basis.' 85
2. "Well grounded in fact and . . . law." -

In changing the

Rule 11 certification test from "good ground" to "well grounded in
fact and.

. .

warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for

the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law,"'186 and by
deleting the "willfulness" requirement, the stringent requirements
for imposing sanctions under the former Rule are eased, thereby encouraging courts to punish recalcitrant parties or their attorneys
87
more frequently.
To determine whether a pleading is well grounded, the advisory
180.

Id. at 22.

181.

Id.

182. Id. at 27 (citation omitted).
183. Id.
184. In re TC1, Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 447 (7th Cir. 1985) ("An attorney who wants to
strike off on a new path in the law must make an effort to determine the nature of the principles he is applying [or challenging]; he may not impose the expense of doing this on his adversaries - who are likely to be just as busy and will not be amused by a claim that the rigors of
daily practice excuse legal research.").
185. Rodgers, 596 F. Supp. at 26.

186.

FED. R. Civ. P. 11. This standard is borrowed from the MODEL RULES OF PROFES-

SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1983), which states that "[a] lawyer shall not bring or defend a

proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is
not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal
of existing law."

187.

FED. R. Civ. P. I1 advisory committee's note. See supra notes 23-44 and accompa-

nying text.
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committee notes suggest that a court examine whether conduct was
reasonable under circumstances existing at the time the pleading was
filed.""' The drafters' intent was to replace the former standard of
subjective bad faith with "more focused" objective criteria 8 9 that
serve to protect attorneys who reach reasonable but erroneous conclusions about the validity of their claims. 190 Nevertheless, as Judge
Jack Weinstein pointed out in a very thoughtful opinion on remand
in Eastway Construction Corp. v. City of New York [Eastway 11],191
Rule 11, as amended, has both subjective and objective components:
The text suggests that the obligation imposed by the Rule is partly
objective, and partly subjective. The requirement that the attorney
base his certification on a "reasonable inquiry" is objective, because what is "reasonable" is judged by objective norms of reasonable attorneys. But the certification itself need only state that the
motion is well grounded "to the best of [the attorney's] knowledge,
information, and belief." Since the certification relates to the attorney's own beliefs, it appears that it should be judged by a subjective standard. Even the subjective component has objective aspects
since, as a matter of evidence, the judge will rely on what reasonable lawyers would have known or believed
under the circumstances
92
in deciding what this lawyer believed.1
To the extent that judicial construction of Rule 11 ignores the subjective element and measures "well grounded" from the perspective
of a hypothetical reasonable person, the very "wisdom of hindsight"
that the drafters sought to avoid comes into play. 193
While the courts have generally moved away from the rigorous
subjective bad faith standard and have held that the amended Rule
imposes an objective standard of conduct,194 the criteria for deter188.

FED. R. Civ. P. II advisory committee's note.

189. Id.
190.

Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 567 (E.D.N.Y.

1986).
191. 637 F. Supp. 558 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
192. Id. at 566-67.
193. Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note ("ihe court is expected to avoid
using the wisdom of hindsight," and instead determine whether the attorney's conduct was
reasonable at the time the pleading or other document was filed).
194. See, e.g., Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir.
1985). The court stated:
Prior to the 1983 amendment, the rule spoke in plainly subjective terms: An attorney's certification of a pleading was an assertion that "to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief, there [was] good ground to support it." The rule, therefore,
contemplated sanctions only where there was a showing of bad faith, and the only
proper inquiry was the subjective belief of the attorney at the time the pleading was
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mining whether a pleading is nevertheless "well grounded" remain
somewhat elusive. The varying attitudes of judges toward imposing
sanctions is partly responsible for the lack of consensus in this area.
Some judges are simply opposed to sanctions in principle and are
therefore reluctant to impose them. 195 Other judges may simply wish
to move slowly with sanctions in order to give the bar an opportunity
to familiarize themselves with the new standards. Another factor
contributing to the lack of consensus may be the twin aims of monetary sanctions and their relationship to substantive standards. Monetary sanctions under Rule 11 are designed both to compensate the
victims of abusive practices and to deter future misconduct. To the
extent that deterrence is a goal, subjective intent is important. On
signed.
The addition of the words "formed after a reasonable inquiry" [in amended
Rule 11] demand that we revise our inquiry. No longer is it enough for an attorney
to claim that he acted in good faith, or that he personally was unaware of the
groundless nature of an argument or claim. For the language of the new Rule 11
explicitly and unambiguously imposes an affirmative duty on each attorney to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the viability of a pleading before it is signed. Simply
put, subjective good faith no longer provides the safe harbor it once did.
Id. at 253 (citations omitted). See Wells v. Oppenheimer & Co., 101 F.R.D. 358, 359
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (court may impose sanctions where an attorney has no objective basis for
believing that a motion is well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law or good faith
argument to change the law), vacated on other grounds, 106 F.R.D. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
See also Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 103 F.R.D. 124, 128 (N.D. Cal.
1984) (absence of bad faith is irrelevant to the imposition of sanctions under amended Rule
11), rev'd on other grounds, 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986); Rodgers, 596 F. Supp. at 27
(standard under amended Rule 11 is an objective one of reasonableness; it is irrelevant what
an individual lawyer thinks), aff d, 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985); Pudlo v. IRS, 587 F. Supp.
1010, 1011 (N.D. I11.1984) ("Unlike the bad faith standard [of old Rule 11], [amended] Rule
11 is objective in its application except to the extent a litigant argues for a change in the
law."). But see Suslick v. Rothschild Sec. Corp., 741 F.2d 1000, 1007 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Rule
11 requires a finding of subjective bad faith on the part of the person against whom fees are to
be assessed."). This "holding" in Suslick has generated much confusion, for it calls into question, at least in the Seventh Circuit, the precedential value of the contrary but persuasive
holdings in that Circuit. Although Suslick dealt with alleged attorney misconduct in 1982, the
Seventh Circuit inexplicably quoted amended Rule I1 in a footnote. Id. at 1003 n.3. The
Seventh Circuit, in affirming Rodgers, reasoned that Suslick, having been decided under old
Rule 11, did not apply to the amended rule. Rodgers, 771 F.2d at 205. Other Seventh Circuit
cases have similarly cast doubt on the viability of the Suslick decision. See, e.g., Indianapolis
Colts v. Mayor of Baltimore, 775 F.2d 177, 181 (7th Cir. 1985) ("According to the Advisory
Committee Notes, however, the amended standard is 'more stringent than a good faith
formula' and is 'one of reasonableness under the circumstances.' "); In re TCI, Ltd., 769 F.2d
441, 445 (7th Cir. 1985) ("If a lawyer pursues a path that a reasonably careful attorney would
have known, after appropriate inquiry, to be unsound, the conduct is objectively unreasonable
and vexatious."). But see Nelson v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 750 F.2d 1234, 1238 (4th Cir.
1984) (applying bad faith standard), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1116 (1985).
195. See supra note 84.
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the other hand, intent is irrelevant if compensation is the goal. As

discussed above, 196 some judges will not impose sanctions unless bad

faith is shown, even though the new Rule 11 standard was intended
by the drafters to be objective.
In Eastway Construction Corp. v. City of New York [Eastway

1] ,17 the Second Circuit held that sanctions would be appropriate
where the pleading is interposed for an improper purpose or where,
after reasonable inquiry, a competent attorney could form a reasonable belief that the pleading is not well grounded in fact or is not
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.19 The opinion, however, sheds no light on what constitutes "reasonable inquiry" or a
"competent attorney." Rather, by restating Rule 11 so as to elimi-

nate the subjective elements incorporated by the drafters, Eastway
11 holds attorneys strictly liable for mistakes in judgment that lead
to filing claims subsequently deemed frivolous.199
The majority of courts, rather than plumbing the depths of Rule
11 and the advisory committee notes, have simply turned to less ana-

lytical surrogates to determine whether a pleading is well grounded
from an objective point of view.200 Thus, sanctions have been granted
where the action of the party or its att6rney is "baseless,

"dishonest,
196.
197.

198.
199.
200.
201.

cynical

and

mendacious,"20 2

"frivolous,

20 1

203

See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985).
Id. at 254.
Eastway 11, 637 F. Supp. at 567.
See infra notes 201-215 and accompanying text.
Van Berkel v. Fox Farm & Road Mach., 581 F. Supp. 1248, 1251 (D. Minn.

1984).
202. Cf Ornelas v. Heckler, 598 F. Supp. 1089, 1090 (D. Colo. 1984) (full compliance
with Rule 11 found, but sanctions were awarded pursuant to the attorney fee provisions of the
Equal Access to Justice Act and the Social Security Act).
203. Heimbaugh v. City of San Francisco, 591 F. Supp. 1573, 1577 (N.D. Cal. 1984);
Fredrick v. Clark, 587 F. Supp. 789, 794 (W.D. Wis. 1984); Booker v. City of Atlanta, 586 F.
Supp. 340, 341 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Dore v. Schultz, 582 F. Supp. 154, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
See also Steinberg v. St. Regis/Sheraton Hotel, 583 F. Supp. 421, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The
term "frivolous" is perhaps the most frequently invoked surrogate for the Rule 11 standard. It
is synonymous with "less than a scintilla" or "manifestly insufficient or futile." Eastway II,
637 F. Supp. at 565. The term "frivolous" may be used as a shorthand description of the Rule
11 standard. Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 831 n.7 (9th Cir. 1986). In
Zaldivar, the court stated:
Thus, we affirm that Rule II sanctions shall be assessed if the paper filed in district
court and signed by an attorney or an unrepresented party is frivolous, legally unreasonable, or without factual foundation, even though the paper was not filed in
subjective bad faith [footnote omitted].
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"groundless,
excusable,

' 204

' 20 8

"harassing and vexatious,'

"lacking in

merit," 207

'z° 5

"irresponsible and in-

"patently untenable," 208 "spe-

cious,"20 9 "grounded on nothing but tactical or strategic expediency, ' 210 and "worthless.1 211 Conversely, sanctions have been denied

where the offending behavior was "not . . . unreasonable,"212 not
"devoid of basis, '213 or "not imposed to harass. 21 4 In addition, sev-

eral courts have denied sanctions upon failure to show "bad
faith."2 1 5
While the above phrases are useful vehicles by which to decide

individual cases, they do not furnish a meaningful benchmark by
which to judge the propriety of sanctions in general. A review of

cases, however, reveals a number of useful guidelines. 21 First, to be
well grounded, a claim must have a plausible legal basis. Where a
legal view is rejected by an unbroken line of Supreme Court authority, it is not objectively well grounded, no matter how fervently the
attorney believes in the righteousness of his client's position. 1 7 On
We accept this formulation fully aware that no combination of abstract words
may correctly apply to every case.
Id. at 831.
204. United States ex rel. U.S.-Namibia (Southwest Africa) Trade & Cultural Council,
Inc. v. Africa Fund, 588 F. Supp. 1350, 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
205. Taylor v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 594 F. Supp. 226, 227 (N.D.N.Y.), affd,
751 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1984).
206. Id.
207. Dore v. Schultz, 582 F. Supp. 154, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). See Rodgers, 596 F.
Supp. at 27; Fredrick v. Clark, 587 F. Supp. 789, 793 (W.D. Wis. 1984).
208. SFM Corp. v. Sundstrand Corp., 102 F.R.D. 555, 557 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
209. See Blair v. United States Treasury Dep't, 596 F. Supp. 273, 282 (N.D. Ind.
1984).
210. Huettig & Schromm, Inc. v. Landscape Contractors Council, 582 F. Supp. 1519,
1522 (N.D. Cal. 1984), afld, 790 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1986).
211. Rodgers, 596 F. Supp. at 28.
212. Leema Enters., Inc. v. Willi, 582 F. Supp. 255, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
213. Gold v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 580 F. Supp. 50, 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
214. Meistrich v. Executive Monetary Mgmt., Inc., No. 83 Civ. 1636 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
27, 1984) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist. file).
215. Suslick v. Rothschild Sec. Corp., 741 F.2d 1000, 1007 (7th Cir. 1984); Williams v.
Birzon, 576 F. Supp. 577, 580 (W.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 740 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1984). See also
Linker v. Custom-Bilt Mach., Inc., 594 F. Supp. 894, 899 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (court denied
motion to strike an affirmative defense which alleged that plaintiff's amended complaint was
commenced in bad faith, in part because "plaintiff's bad faith motive raises the issue of his
compliance with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure").
216. See infra notes 217-24 and accompanying text.
217. Rodgers, 596 F. Supp. at 27. See also Young v. IRS, 596 F. Supp. 141, 151-52
(N.D. Ind. 1984) (action challenging general validity and applicability of income tax laws is
appropriate for Rule 11 sanctions); Cameron v. IRS, 593 F. Supp. 1540, 1557-58 (N.D. Ind.
1984) (sanctions appropriate when, despite clear precedent demonstrating the claim's un-
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the other hand, where there is no solid line of authority or the au-

thorities are questionable, attorneys have greater leeway and less risk
of incurring sanctions.218 Second, the more complex the issues involved, the less likely that courts will impose sanctions. Courts have
demonstrated a marked reluctance to impose sanctions in developing
areas of the law presenting complicated questions, such as civil
RICO219 and personal jurisdiction. 220 Third, repeated instigation of
lawsuits or repeated interposition of previously adjudicated claims
suggests to courts that the claims are not well grounded, but rather
are interposed for an improper purpose, such as delay or harassment. 22 ' Fourth, sanctions are not appropriate merely because a
court, upon full consideration of the issue, has concluded that the
complaint fails to state a claim.222 Fifth, Rule 11 applies equally to
pro se parties; courts have not hesitated to order sanctions where
such parties have behaved irresponsibly. 223 Last, while courts are
now less reluctant to impose sanctions, they still view sanctions as a
very serious matter and tend to impose them most consistently where
224
the abuse is clear-cut.
A final issue relates to the obligation of the attorney in making
a good faith argument "for the extension, modification, or reversal of
tenability, the plaintiff argues that income taxes do not apply to him), affid, 773 F.2d 126 (7th
Cir. 1985); Sunn v. Dean, 597 F. Supp. 79, 83-84 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (civil rights suits against
jurors and counsel merely due to loss of claim are candidates for Rule I I sanctions).
218. See Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Hess, 594 F. Supp. 273, 282 (N.D.
Cal. 1984) (novel jurisdictional issue under ERISA); Hudson v. LaRouche, 579 F. Supp. 623,
631 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (confusing state of authority regarding RICO claims).
219. See Kostos v. Janney Montgomery Scott Inc., No. 83 Civ. 6305-CSH (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 10, 1984) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file); Gramercy 222 Residents Corp. v. Gramercy Realty Assocs., 591 F. Supp. 1408, 1415 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Hudson v. LaRouche, 579
F. Supp. 623, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
220. Leema Enters., Inc. v. Willi, 582 F. Supp. 255, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
221. See Fried v. Fried, 113 F.R.D. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (sanctions granted where
claim had been rejected in a prior suit); United States ex rel. U.S.-Namibia (Southwest Africa) Trade & Cultural Council, Inc., v. Africa Fund, 588 F. Supp. 1350, 1352 (S.D.N.Y.
1984).
222. Ring v. R.J. Reynolds Indus., Inc., 597 F. Supp. 1277, 1281 (N.D. IIl. 1984). See
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 109 F.R.D. 121, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("Not
every successful defense will result in attorneys' fees, only those which establish unusual facts
to demonstrate . . . a lack of good faith in the initiation of the claim.").
223. See, e.g., Young v. IRS, 596 F. Supp. 141, 151-52 (N.D. Ind. 1984); Carbana v.
Cruz, 595 F. Supp. 585, 588 n.5 (D.P.R. 1984), affid, 767 F.2d 905 (Ist Cir. 1985); Fredrick
v. Clark, 587 F. Supp. 789, 794 (W.D. Wis. 1984). But see S.M. KASSIN, supra note 30, at 4143 (survey conducted by Federal Judicial Center indicates that judges tend to be more lenient
with pro se litigants than with counsel).
224. See supra notes 201-11 and accompanying text.
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existing law. '225 On this question, little judicial guidance has been
given. In Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v. Burroughs Corp.,22 6
the district court imposed sanctions on defense counsel for failure to

indicate that arguments made in support of his client's positions
were based, not on existing law, but rather on how counsel thought

the law should be. 227 The court found that although the arguments
advanced were meritorious, and hence not frivolous, it objected to
the "misleading" manner in which the position was advocated.2 2 8
Reversing the district court, the Ninth Circuit held that the

court below should have focused on whether there was a sound basis
in fact or law for the argument, rather than requiring lawyers to
identify which position is supported by existing law and which would
extend the law.2 29 The court of appeals rejected the district court's
view that Rule 11 imposed an ethical duty of candor similar to that

established by the ABA Model Rules.230 The appellate court expressed special concern that standards enunciated by the court below
would discourage zealous advocacy by creating a conflict between
the lawyer's duty in representing the client and the lawyer's interest
225. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
226. 103 F.R.D. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
227. Id. at 126-28.
228. Id.
229. 801 F.2d 1531, 1538 (9th Cir. 1986).
230. Id. at 1539. The district court's decision was grounded on two bases: (1) that Rule
11 is violated where counsel does not distinguish between existing law and an argument to
change existing law; and (2) that counsel's failure to cite adverse authority violated Rule 11.
The circuit court rejected both these grounds. With regard to "argument identification," the
court advanced the following five reasons for its rejection:
1. The text of the rule does not require counsel to distinguish between arguments based on
existing law and arguments to change the law, id. at 1539;
2. To uphold the lower court's standard would chill advocacy by creating a conflict between
the attorney's duty of zealous representation and desire to avoid criticism, id. at 1540;
3. Rule 11 applies to frivolous motions, not to non-frivolous motions that the court later
determines are unjustified, id;
4. The lower court's rule would multiply the task of judges and increase the costs of litigation, id. at 1540-41;
S. The rule would inevitably be applied in close cases which would increase the danger of
arbitrariness in the decision making process and decrease the probability of uniform enforcement, id. at 1541-42.
Similarly, the court of appeals rejected the second ground for the district court's decision. The
appellate court noted that many of the same considerations that undermined the first argument
were applicable here. Id. at 1541. The court expressed concern that the broad reading given by
the lower court would unduly burden bench and bar. Id. at 1542. The court rejected the notion
that Rule 11 should be interpreted to create "two ladders for after-the-fact review of asserted
unethical conduct: one consisting of sanction procedures, the other consisting of well-established bar and court ethical procedures." Id. at 1542.
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in avoiding rebuke.23' In addition, the circuit court found it inappropriate to impose Rule 11 sanctions for counsel's failure to cite adverse authority. 232 The court reasoned that to permit sanctions on
this basis would lead to sanctions on close issues, increase the burdens on the parties and the courts, and increase the cost of litigation.238 The Ninth Circuit was obviously concerned that the trial
court's formulation of attorney obligations under Rule 11 was too
burdensome, but provided little instruction as to how an attorney,
consistent with Rule 11, could make a good faith argument for a
change in the law. One way for the advocate to avoid the Rule 11
thicket is simply to be honest with the court. If there is contrary
authority, he should note that authority and state why it does not
pertain. If analogy is the basis of the argument, he should make that
point clear. Straightforwardness will increase the advocate's credibility in the eyes of the court, and lessen, if not eliminate, the likelihood of sanctions. While the cases provide some notion as to when
sanctions are appropriate, the courts have only begun to give shape
to the amorphous "well grounded" test. A broader standard of more
universal applicability, discussed in part V of this Article, is therefore desirable.
3. Rule 11 and Summary Judgment. - Amended Rule 11 applies to motions, including summary judgment motions, as well as
pleadings. 3 ' Traditionally, summary judgment motions have had
two separate and distinct functions: (1) to determine whether there
is a material issue of fact necessitating a trial, or whether the matter
can be disposed of on questions of law without a trial; and (2) to
gain discovery.2 35 To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the
party against whom the motion is made must come forward with
facts demonstrating that it is entitled to a trial.236 Essentially, that
party must produce evidence that a trial is warranted, or else face
summary disposition of its claims or defenses. A party which, for
whatever reason, has been unable to pin down an opponent through
231.
232.
233.
234.
motions.
235.

Id. at 1540.
Id. at 1541-42.
Id. at 1542.
FED. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(3) makes the Rule 11 certification requirement applicable to

See C. WRIGHT. A. MILLER & M. KANE. FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
2712 (2d ed. 1983); C. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 88 (2d ed.
1947) (Rule 56 not only provides an effective means for summary action, but also serves as a
discovery instrument by forcing disclosure of the merits of either claims or defenses).
236. C. WRIGHT. THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 99 (4th ed. 1983).
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discovery, may wish to flush out the opponent by a summary judg37
ment motion, even where material issues of fact exist.1
When a material issue of fact is undeniably present, a motion
for summary judgment would not be well grounded and would
clearly violate Rule 11.11 s On the other hand, summary judgment
has been traditionally recognized as an appropriate discovery vehicle. 39 Therefore, as long as a summary judgment motion is reasonably calculated to flush out the facts underlying the opponent's contentions, and is not made for purposes of harassment or delay, Rule
11 sanctions should not be applied.
In addition, prohibition of summary judgment motions for discovery purposes would rob litigants of a potent weapon with which to
force disclosure. Less disclosure may seriously impair meaningful
settlement negotiations. Broad pretrial disclosure and encouragement
of settlement, two policy goals which the Federal Rules seek to foster,2 40 would be imperiled by a literal reading of amended Rule 11 as
applied to summary judgment motions. Summary judgment motions,
therefore, should be permitted as a discovery mechanism as long as
such motions are geared to obtaining legitimate pretrial disclosure
and not interposed for improper purposes.
4. Misuse of Rule 11 Sanctions. - While the arguments for
increased use of sanctions as a tool to combat litigation abuse are
sound, if not compelling, there nevertheless remains a danger that
sanctions motions themselves may be misused and thereby become
tools of oppression, and that sanctions will lead to widespread satellite litigation, which will increase expenses and prolong court delays.2' 4 1 The courts must be alert to prevent Rule 11 sanctions motions from becoming instruments of harassment, intimidation,
retaliation, and delay. Sanctions motions raise serious questions of
professional misconduct and are not appropriate every time a court
denies a motion or dismisses part or all of a claim.2 42 Nor should
Rule 11 be used to test the sufficiency of the form or content of a
pleading; the Federal Rules have adequate provisions to do so
237. C.

WRIGHT. A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 235, § 2712.
238. In re Digital Equip. Corp. Sec. Litig., 601 F. Supp. 311, 316 (D. Mass. 1984)
(since summary judgment improper where disputes of material fact exist, counsel cannot properly make such a motion if he knows of a disputed fact).
239. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
240. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 236, § 81.
241. See Schwarzer, supra note 2, at 183-84; Weinstein, Reflections on 1983 Amendments to U.S. Rules of Civil Procedure, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 14, 1983, at 1, col. 3.
242. See Weinstein, supra note 241, at 4, col. 1.
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outside of Rule 11.243
A second caveat regarding sanctions is that their frequent use
2 44
may prove counterproductive by spawning satellite litigation.
Sanctions hearings delay not only the case in question but also all
other cases in the judicial pipeline. They also divert a court's attention from the key issues in dispute. 45 Use of sanctions motions tends
to discourage cooperation among the parties. 6 Sanctions are most
effective when used to remedy specific abuses in a particular lawsuit
and can have an undesirable effect if employed as a panacea for all
litigation abuse. Professor Maurice Rosenberg, a preeminent authority in the civil procedure field, noted that more intensive use of sanc2 47
tions may undermine the basic purposes of the Federal Rules:
"More and 'better' rules may not be the answer. Rules require sanctions. Sanctions require enforcement proceedings. These absorb resources of time, energy, and money that it is the very purpose of the
rules to spare. '2' 4 Even Arthur Miller, the drafter of Rule 11 and a
proponent of broader use of sanctions, confessed to having a
"Kafkaesque dream" of courts being besieged by sanctions motions. 24 9 Indeed, courts have cautioned against routine sanctions
filings. 250
It is arguable, however, that the upsurge in sanctions motions is
a short-term phenomenon, and that after an initial shakeout period
of heightened activity in which standards are developed, Rule 11
motions will become less frequent.2 51 Nevertheless, a disturbing
243. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(e), (f).
244. Eastway II, 637 F. Supp. at 564.
245. See Miller & Culp, The New Rules of Civil Procedure: Managing Cases, Limiting
Discovery, Nat'l L. J., Dec. 5, 1983, at 23, col. 1.
246. See Weinstein, supra note 241, at 4, col. 1. Cooperation among the parties during
all phases of a given case is desirable, and to the extent that courts encourage sanctions motions or evidence a willingness to entertain such motions routinely, the spirit of collegiality and
cooperation among the parties may be impaired and a hostile atmosphere may develop which
threatens the progress of the litigation. See also Eastern District Report, supra note 7, at 369
(cooperation and courtesy among counsel is essential to ensure the timely and cost-efficient
exchange of information through discovery).
247. See Rosenberg, supra note 13, at 244.
248. Id.
249. Annual Judicial Conference, Second Judicial Circuit of the United States, 101
F.R.D. 161, 200 (1984) (remarks of Arthur Miller during panel discussion on topic of Pretrial
Preparationand Handling of Civil Cases).
250. See, e.g., C.P. Lam v. Mass Confusion Sportswear, Inc., No. 86-Civ. 2728
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist. file) ("It must be emphasized that
a request for Rule 11 sanctions should not be appended to every moving paper as a mechanical
gesture or 'client rebate.' ").
251. Arthur Miller suggested that sanctions activities, much like class action suits fol-
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trend toward more frequent imposition of sanctions has emerged. 252
In Eastway 1,253 the district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims but
declined to impose sanctions on the grounds that the action was not

frivolous.254 Reversing the lower court on the latter point, the Second
Circuit unambiguously endorsed the imposition of sanctions for Rule
11 transgressions:
By employing the imperative "shall," we believe the drafters
intended to stress the mandatory nature of the imposition of sanctions pursuant to the rule. Unlike the statutory provisions that vest
the district court with "discretion" to award fees, Rule 11 is clearly
phrased as a directive. Accordingly, where strictures of the rule
have been transgressed, it255 is incumbent upon the district court to
fashion proper sanctions.

The message from the Second Circuit is clear: trial courts
should not hesitate to impose sanctions.25" As a result, in insurance

cases and other matters involving third party interests, the parties
may feel legally obligated to seek sanctions in the form of attorney's
fees where claims are arguably frivolous. As Arthur Miller has suggested, sanctions practice may well prove to be the "cottage indus-

try" of the 19801s.257
5. Standards for Review of Sanctions Orders. -

With respect

to standards for appellate review of sanctions orders, two issues

arise: (1) whether Rule 11 has in fact been violated; and (2) whether
the particular sanction imposed is appropriate.5 8 In reviewing lower
court orders on whether a violation has occurred, appellate courts
may have to engage in several separate inquiries. 59 If the trial court
lowing the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, will follow a bell-shaped pattern. Under this view,
one would expect few sanctions proceedings as the Rule is introduced, followed by a flurry of
activity which will decline and level off as standards are developed. See Annual Judicial Conference, supra note 249, at 200 (remarks of Arthur Miller).
252. Miller & Culp, supra note 245, at 34, col. 2 ("[A] number of federal judges have
remarked: 'I issue many more sanction orders today,' or 'I engage in much more cost-shifting
today than I used to.' ").

253. 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985).
254. Id. at 248-49.
255. Id. at 254 n.7. The court further held that the appellate courts were as capable of
determining Rule II violations as the lower courts, and, therefore, the decision of the court
below was not entitled to any special deference. Id.
256. But see Fried v. Fried, 113 F.R.D. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("In considering this motion [for sanctions], we start by noting that our Court of Appeals seems strongly opposed to
district judges imposing sanctions.").
257. Miller & Culp, supra note 245, at 34, col. 3.
258. See Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 828 (9th Cir. 1986).
259. See id.
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has ordered sanctions based on a factual determination which is disputed on appeal, the findings are reviewed on a clearly erroneous
standard. 6 ° If the district court concludes that the facts found constitute a violation of Rule 11, then a de novo standard of review is
appropriate.26 ' Where the issue on appeal is the appropriateness of
the particular sanction imposed, however, the appellate court may
reverse only if it finds an abuse of discretion, 6 2 since the trial court
had discretion to tailor the sanction to the facts of the case.2 3 As
Judge Weinstein observed: "Necessarily, the district court will have
a better grasp of what is acceptable trial-level practice among litigating members of the bar than will appellate judges. 26 4
Thus, fee-shifting may not be an appropriate sanction in every
case. Judges may consider imposing alternative sanctions, including
a reprimand, an order to complete certain remedial courses, requiring consultation with more experienced practitioners, or obligating
the sanctioned counsel to attend court sessions.26 5
V.

A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR RULE 11 ENFORCEMENT

The standard for attorney conduct under Rule 11 - "reasonableness under the circumstances" 2 6 - is too vague to provide meaningful guidance for lawyers, litigants, or the courts. Under this standard, attorneys are always at risk of being second-guessed as to what
more might have been done prior to filing. Although the principal
thrust of amended Rule 11 is to deter frivolous suits, mandatory
sanctions unquestionably have a punitive aspect, and are therefore
akin to criminal penalties. The magnitude of these penalties dictates
that the standards necessary to comport with Rule 11 must be
clearly defined. Bright line rules are necessary under Rule 11 so that
such standards will not be taken lightly. It may be argued that promulgation of such standards will encourage attorneys to aspire only
to the minimum level of acceptable conduct. The benefits which
260. Id. See Westmoreland v. CBS Inc., 770 F.2d 1168, 1174-75 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
Eastway II, 637 F. Supp. at 566.
261. Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 828 (9th Cir. 1986). See Eastway I,
762 F.2d at 254 n.7.
262. Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 828 (9th Cir. 1986).
263. Eastway II, 637 F. Supp. at 566; FED. R. Civ. P. I I advisory committee's note. See
Albright v. Upjohn Co., 788 F.2d 1217, 1222 (6th Cir. 1986) (the selection of a particular

sanction lies in the sound discretion of the court); Muslin v. Frelinghuysen Livestock Managers, Inc., 777 F.2d 1230, 1235 (7th Cir. 1985) (denial of attorney's fees is discretionary).
264. Eastway 11, 637 F. Supp. at 566.
265.
266.

Id.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
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spring from reasonable certainty, however, outweigh the risks of undistinguished performances by attorneys.
Set forth below is a proposed objective framework containing
bright line presumptions to assist in determining whether a pleading
is based on "reasonable inquiry," and whether it is "well grounded"
in fact and in law. The framework builds on the principles which
have evolved in the lower court Rule 11 decisions, and is designed to
provide standards broadly applicable to most cases. Since a number
of different factors may determine whether a particular pleading is
"reasonable under the circumstances," the standards of conduct are
best visualized on a spectrum, rather than simply compartmentalized
as "reasonable" or "unreasonable."
Within the spectrum there are three distinct zones: (1) clearly
reasonable; (2) clearly unreasonable; and (3) a mid-zone where the
conduct cannot be readily categorized. Where conduct is at either
end of the spectrum, the presumption of propriety or impropriety is
nearly conclusive and can be overcome only upon a compelling showing. Where conduct falls within the mid-zone, it may be "presumptively reasonable" or "presumptively unreasonable," depending on
the specific circumstances involved. "Presumptively" as used herein
simply means that if an attorney chooses to act differently, the burden is upon him to justify such conduct if it is challenged. 26 7 This
mechanism leaves ample room to deal with aberrant situations or
particular circumstances calling for different behavior.26 8 These
bright line standards are designed to clarify the obligations of the
litigants and their attorneys, and thereby to reduce the need to impose sanctions. At the same time, presumptions facilitate the imposition of sanctions where the standards have been violated.
A. Reasonable Inquiry
1. Clearly Reasonable Zone. - Where an attorney has conferred with the client, independently verified the client's position
through a review of the relevant documentary evidence, and thoroughly researched applicable law prior to the filing of a pleading,
then he has done everything one could reasonably expect from an
advocate. Such conduct, which is clearly above reproach, would epitomize "reasonable inquiry." Sanctions could be granted only upon a
267.
268.

Eastern District Report, supra note 7, at 368.
See id. (concept of presumptive standards is similar to that adopted by Eastern

District of New York in the Standing Orders of the Court on Effective Discovery in Civil
Cases, 102 F.R.D. 339 (1984), which became effective on March 1, 1984).
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clear and convincing showing to the contrary, and hence would normally be inappropriate. On the other hand, few cases are likely to
fall within this zone, since it is always arguable that something more
could have been done.

2. Clearly Unreasonable Zone. - Where an attorney fails to
make any prefiling inquiry as to the facts or the law, his conduct
does not meet even the lowest aspirations of Rule 11, and is therefore clearly unreasonable. 9 Clearly unreasonable conduct also includes situations where: (1) the suit is based on unverified rumor as
hearsay; 270 (2) the pleader willfully misrepresents or mischaracterizes the law or the facts; 27' (3) the pleading reveals a fatal and irremedial defect on its face; 27 2 and (4) the pleader has continued to
maintain a claim or defense, to the detriment of his adversary, even
though uncontradicted and irrefutable facts destroying the claim or
defense have been called to his attention by the adversary.273 The
strong presumption of unreasonableness in these cases can be overcome only upon a clear and convincing justification for the pleader's
conduct.
3. Mid-Spectrum. - This vast middle area between the
"clearly reasonable" and "clearly unreasonable" ends of the spec269. See, e.g., Wymer v. Lessin, 109 F.R.D. 114, 116 (D.D.C. 1985) (failure of the
defense counsel to inquire into citizenship of client in a diversity case violates the Rule 11
profiling investigation requirement); Steinberg v. St. Regis/Sheraton Hotel, 583 F. Supp. 421,
426 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); RPS Corp. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 1984-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH), 166, 268 (N.D. Il1. 1984), afrid without opinion, 787 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1986).
270. See Albright v. Upjohn Co., 788 F.2d 1217 (6th Cir. 1986) (prefiling investigation
was found to be insufficient because it failed to disclose how the plaintiff's claim could be
substantiated in the likely event that medical records could not be located). See also Miller v.
Schweickart, 413 F. Supp. 1059, 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (plaintiffs had no justification, other
than unconfirmed rumor, for including a particular defendant in the action).
271. See, e.g., Smith v. United Transp. Union Local No. 81, 594 F. Supp. 96, 100-01
(S.D. Cal. 1984); Aller v. New York Bd. of Elections, 586 F. Supp. 603, 607-08 (S.D.N.Y.
1984).
272. Thus, for example, where it is clear that in personam jurisdiction over a party is
lacking, the prefiling investigation is deficient. See Shaps v. D.F.D.S. A/F Copenhagen, 1 Fed.
R. Serv. 3d 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Hasty v. Paccar, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 1577, 1580 (E.D. Mo.
1984); Barton v. Williams, 38 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 966 (N.D. Ohio 1983). Similarly, Rule 11 is
violated where subject matter jurisdiction is clearly lacking. See Wymer v. Lessin, 109 F.R.D.
114 (D.D.C. 1985); McLaughlin v. Western Casualty and Sur. Co., 603 F. Supp. 978, 981-82
(S.D. Ala. 1985); Huettig & Schromm, Inc. v. Landscape Contractors Council, 582 F. Supp.
1519 (N.D. Cal. 1984), arfd, 790 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1986); Schwarzer, supra note 2, at 19091.
273. See, e.g., City of Yonkers v. Otis Elevator Co., 106 F.R.D. 524, 525 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (sanctions are appropriate where allegations of fraud clearly had no basis in fact, and
where defendants had given plaintiff ample opportunity to withdraw its claim). See supra
notes 148-52, 175 and accompanying text.
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trum is the most difficult in which to develop bright line rules, since
a number of factors may affect the reasonableness of the conduct in
question. The conduct in this mid-zone is characterized as presumptively reasonable or presumptively unreasonable, and the party
against whom the presumption lies bears the burden of justifying his
conduct by a preponderance of the evidence. Set forth below are examples delineating an attorney's responsibilities in various factual
settings.
a. Reliance solely on the client - Presumptively reasonable.
very least, Rule 11, with one possible exception discussed beAt the
low, 274 requires that an attorney confer with his client prior to filing
a pleading. While an attorney-client conference is generally a necessary condition of "reasonable inquiry," it is not clear to what extent
such a prefiling conference is a sufficient condition of "reasonable
inquiry." The advisory committee notes suggest that there are circumstances where reliance solely on the client is proper. 5 Such reliance may be sufficient where time constraints for filing the pleading
are such that an attorney has no time to confirm independently the
client's position, and therefore must rely on the client. 276 For example, where an attorney is retained just prior to the statute of limitations expiration date, or must respond promptly to a pleading under
governing rules of procedure, the client's word should suffice.27 7 Similarly, where verifying data is not readily accessible, 278 or would be
unduly expensive to obtain considering the amount in controversy,
the limitations on the client's resources, and the importance of the
issues at stake,27 9 independent verification should not be required.
Hence, if corroborating information were located overseas or if its
exact location were unknown, reliance on the client would be
sufficient.280
274. See infra notes 284-88 and accompanying text.
275.

FED. R. Civ. P. II advisory committee's note.

276. See FED. R. COv. P. 11 advisory committee's note (this is a circumstance contemplated by the drafters of Rule 11).

277. See Rothschild, Fenton & Swanson, supra note 2, at 14.
278. Such data may, for example, be in the hands of third parties and unavailable in the
absence of a subpoena.
279. This standard incorporates the proportionality concept applicable to discovery re-

quests under FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g). While the proportionality criteria are arguably vague,
using this standard has two distinct advantages. First, it provides the court with general guidance on how extensive a pretrial investigation should be. Second, it adopts an existing standard
and can thereby benefit from the case law which develops under Rule 26(g).
280. Cf. Touchstone v. G.B.Q. Corp., 596 F. Supp. 805, 810 (E.D. La. 1984)

("'[R]easonable inquiry' required by Rule 11 varies from case to case. This case involves
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Reliance on the client also may be sufficient where the process
of obtaining verifying data would be so time-consuming as to
prejudice the attorney's ability to handle his other cases.2"' Finally,
corroboration cannot be required when the client's information is impossible to verify. 28 2 In situations where it is the client's word against
that of the other party and the client's position is plausible, the attorney may accept his client's position provided that the client's testimony is competent evidence.28 3
The one possible exception to the general rule that attorneys
must consult with their clients prior to filing a pleading is where the
case was forwarded by another attorney upon whom the attorney in
question reasonably relied for the facts. 84 The advisory committee
notes imply that the signing attorney should not be penalized for the
errors of the forwarding attorney. 285 The key question here is
whether the reliance was "reasonable. 286 The signing attorney
should at least ascertain that the forwarding attorney had solid legal
grounds for the claim.28 7 Time permitting, an independent evaluation
of the facts would be the safest course;288 where time is of the essence, however, the signing attorney may have no choice but to rely
on forwarding counsel. An independent evaluation of the law, however, is necessary.
b. Reliance solely on the client - Presumptively unreasonable.
There are instances where reliance solely on the client is presumptively unreasonable, and further investigation is required in orevents occurring as many as twenty-five years ago of which the principal witness

. . .

is now

deceased. In such a case, before discovery, the facts available that may be inquired into may

be limited.").
281.

This standard is a further refinement of the standard set forth supra in the text

accompanying note 276. It may be argued that the differences between sole practitioners with
limited resources and large firms with deep pockets justify differences in standards. It would be
unfair, however, to make practice standards depend on firm size. These standards were not

designed to create undue burdens on large firms, or to call on sole practitioners to avoid their
responsibilities.
282.

See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (arguably, this is an example of

the situation where the attorney "had to rely on a client for information as to the facts underlying the pleading, motion, or other paper"). But see Ditta G. Melli, S.N.C. v. C. Miller, Inc.,
No. 85 Civ. 9544-CSH (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file) ("Coun-

sel act at their peril if they accept a client's file on faith as complete.").
283. Rothschild, Fenton & Swanson, supra note 2, at 14-15.
284.

See FED. R. Civ. P. I I advisory committee's note.

285.

Rothschild, Fenton & Swanson, supra note 2, at 15.

286.

Cf. Eastway 1, 762 F. 2d at 253 (Rule II unambiguously imposes duty on each

attorney to conduct a reasonable inquiry).
287. Rothschild, Fenton & Swanson, supra note 2, at 15.
288.

Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol14/iss3/2

42

Cavanagh: Developing Standards Under Amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules o
STANDARDS UNDER AMENDED RULE 11

1986]

der to comply with Rule 11. It would be unreasonable to rely solely
on the client's word where his position could be easily corroborated
by checking additional sources. 28 9 Further investigation by the attorney is needed where the adversary furnishes data which undermine
the client's contentions, or where the adversary notifies the attorney
that such data can be obtained without undue effort or expense given
the amount in controversy and the limitations on the client's resources.290 Further investigation is also required where the client has
291
a file of documents relevant to the claim or defense.
Further investigation is also in order where the client's information is internally inconsistent. Hence, where the alleged facts are
contradictory or where the client's story changes in response to the
attorney's questions, independent verification of the client's position
should be sought. 292 Independent verification should also be obtained
where the client is not credible or has a motive to misrepresent
facts. 293 Finally, outside corroboration should be sought where the
client's allegations are simply implausible.29 4 For example, if the client contends that the government has implanted a radio receiver in
his brain and is monitoring his activities, the story is more likely
than not the product of a defective or diseased mind, and the attorney should attempt to verify such facts before proceeding.
c. Further investigation -

Presumptively reasonable.

-

Where the attorney undertakes inquiries beyond the information
provided by his client, the next question concerns how extensive such
inquiries must be. The answer depends on the nature of the information uncovered by the attorney in the course of making follow-up
inquiries. The investigation must be fairly directed at the issues
raised, and may not be a mere token effort. Thus, if the opposing
attorney identifies certain documents which he contends conclusively
289. Van Berkel v. Fox Farm & Road Mach., 581 F. Supp. 1248, 1249-51 (D. Minn.
1984).
290.
291.

See supra notes 148-51, 175 and accompanying text.
See Ditta G. Melli, S.N.C. v. C. Miller, Inc., 85 Civ. 9544-CSH (S.D.N.Y. Nov.

28, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file) (attorney is obligated to do a careful search of
client's file).
292. See, e.g., Van Berkel v. Fox Farm & Road Mach., 581 F. Supp. 1248, 1249-51 (D.

Minn. 1984) (sanctions imposed where plaintiff's attorney refused to dismiss a negligence action after defendant's attorney had forwarded medical records and a copy of a news article

disclosing that the action was time barred).
293. See Kendrick v. Zanides, 609 F. Supp. 1162, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 1985). See also Lyle
v. Charlie Brown Flying Club, Inc., 112 F.R.D. 392 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (cannot accept client's
word when reasonable inquiry reveals otherwise).
294. Rothschild, Fenton & Swanson, supra note 2, at 14.
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undermines the client's claim, the attorney must review those documents.2 5 Similarly, if the opposing attorney names witnesses whose
testimony would vitiate a claim, the attorney should interview such
witnesses if they are available. 29 6 In the end, the attorney must be
satisfied that he has established a sufficient foundation upon which to
297
proceed with a claim.
Rule 11 does not require an attorney to capitulate to the adversary merely because the parties disagree as to the facts of the case or
the applicable law.298 Where further investigation confirms the opponent's view and destroys the client's case, dismissal of the claim or
defense is appropriate. 9 Where further investigation results in information which tends to support the client's view, however, the case
may properly proceed even though facts supporting the opponent's
contentions may also exist.300 If further investigation leads to information which neither confirms nor refutes the client's position, the
attorney is entitled to rely on his client's version of the facts, provided it is plausible.30 1
d. Further investigation- Presumptively unreasonable.- The
mere fact that an attorney has made efforts to verify independently
the client's position does not satisfy the "reasonable inquiry" standard. The quality, not the quantity, of the prefiling investigation is
significant.302 It is not sufficient to rely on general nonspecific impressions of prior counsel.aa Information provided by the adversary
should not be ignored; attorneys who have neglected to pursue the
obvious cannot absolve themselves by seeking out the esoteric. Thus,
295. See Van Berkel v. Fox Farm & Road Mach., 581 F. Supp. 1248 (D. Minn. 1984)
(while medical records revealed that plaintiff's action was time barred, plaintiff's attorney re-

fused to respond to requests for dismissal).
296. See In re Ginther, 791 F.2d 1151, 1155 (5th Cir. 1986); Wold v. Minerals Eng'g
Co., 575 F. Supp. 166, 167 (D. Colo. 1983).
297. See Touchstone v. G.B.Q. Corp., 596 F. Supp. 805, 810 (E.D. La. 1984) ("[Tlhere

comes a time after discovery has progressed that counsel should have knowledge of the specific
facts that would support the conclusion that the action is 'well grounded in fact.' ").
298.

See supra note 152 and accompanying text.

299. Van Berkel v. Fox Farm & Road Mach., 581 F. Supp. 1248 (D. Minn. 1984).
300.

See Friedgood v. Axelrod, 593 F. Supp. 395, 397-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).

301. Cf. Rothschild, Fenton & Swanson, supra note 2, at 14-15 (if a client's story is
plausible but is contradicted by all other witnesses found during prefiling inquiry, an attorney
may still sign the pleading as long as client's proposed testimony is supported by competent
evidence).
302.

See, e.g., Friedgood v. Axelrod, 593 F. Supp. 395, 397-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (sanc-

tions denied where defendant's previous disclosures were suspect and plaintiff's position was
corroborated by others).
303.

Kendrick v. Zanides, 609 F. Supp. 1162, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
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where an attorney fails to make the minimal inquiries which a reasonably competent attorney similarly situated would have made, and
where such inquiries would demonstrate the meritlessness of the client's claim, the attorney may be subject to sanctions, irrespective of
any additional inquiry he has made in other areas.304
B.

"Well Grounded"

The inquiry into the adequacy of the prefiling investigation is
only a threshold matter. Under Rule l Ithe claim must also be "well
grounded in fact" and "warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law. 30°5 Thus, it is not enough that an attorney has crafted a logically compelling theoretical argument in support of claims. In setting
criteria for determining when a claim is well grounded, the same
three-zone analysis can be employed.
1. Clearly Reasonable Zone. - A claim which is supported by
statutes and Supreme Court precedent is the essence of a well
grounded position.30 6 A claim is also clearly well grounded where, in
the absence of Supreme Court precedent, the law of the circuit in
which the case is pending supports the claim.30 7 Similarly, interposition of a claim is proper where the law of the circuit is not settled
but the decisions of either other trial courts within the district, appellate courts outside the circuit, or district courts outside the circuit
support the claim. 808 If the law within the circuit is settled and does
not support the claim, the claim may be pleaded if the law of one or
more other circuits supports it. 309 A claim is also well grounded
304. AM Int'l, Inc., v. Eastman Kodak Co., 39 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 433 (N.D. II!. 1984)
(counsel, who on deposition failed to inquire regarding the witness' previous availability to

testify and subsequently filed motion papers suggesting that witness' counsel had improperly
delayed the deposition, did not conduct an adequate prefiling inquiry).
305. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
306. This is the clearest case of a well-grounded claim. See, e.g., Confederacion

Laborista v. Cerveceria India, Inc., 778 F.2d 65, 66 (1st Cir. 1985) ("Given the clarity of the
precedents of both the Supreme Court and this court on this issue, plaintiffs' claim was en-

tirely unwarranted by existing law or a good faith argument for modification of existing
law.").
307. See Gramercy 222 Residents Corp. v. Gramercy Realty Assocs., 591 F. Supp.
1408, 1415 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (although plaintiffs' complaint failed to meet the requirements
needed to state a RICO claim under the controlling precedents in the Second Circuit, sanc-

tions were not awarded under Rule II due to the "complexity and, previously, rather unclear
status of the RICO statute").
308. See Kamen v. AT&T, 791 F.2d 1006, 1013-14 (2d Cir. 1986) (pleading is warranted by existing law where law is unsettled).
309. See Eastway II, 637 F. Supp. at 575 (noting that bad decisions must be challenged
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where the 0 case is one of first impression and the position is
31

plausible.

There are two situations in which an attorney could properly
certify a claim even though settled law is to the contrary. Factual
distinctions between the case in question and settled authority may

make settled law inapplicable and therefore require a different result.3 11 Furthermore, notwithstanding settled law to the contrary, a

claim may be pleaded where there are compelling economic, sociological, political, or other bases which suggest that a reexamination
or extension of the governing principles is appropriate.31 2 Thus, the
long-established rule of Plessy v. Ferguson,313 which permitted states
to operate "separate but equal" racially segregated public schools,
would have been properly challenged in Brown v. Board of Education,31 4 given the widespread recognition in the mid-twentieth cen-

tury that such a segregated system was inherently unequal and denied blacks their basic constitutional rights. Both of these situations

provide the good faith litigant with room for creativity and a measure of flexibility in pleading, thus allowing the law to develop to
meet the needs of a changing society.
2. Clearly Unreasonable Zone. - Sanctions are proper where
if they are to be overruled).
310. See Nelson v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 750 F.2d 1234, 1238 (4th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1116 (1985).
311. Rothschild, Fenton & Swanson, supra note 2, at 15.
312. For example, state statutes making nonwhites second class citizens came under
gradual attack as members of our society became better educated and more sensitive to the
fact that such statutes were inconsistent with the fundamental rights bestowed by the United
States Constitution.
313. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
314. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Brown is a very clear example of a situation in which a prior
Supreme Court holding was properly overturned. The Supreme Court, however, has overturned rather recent decisions on issues having far less social impact. In February 1985, the
Court, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), held that state
and local employees were subject to the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, thereby overruling
its prior holding in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), wherein the
Court had held, a decade earlier, that the tenth amendment barred the application of this
federal statute to state and local employees. See Eastway I1, 637 F. Supp. at 575, wherein
Judge Weinstein stated:
Sometimes there are reasons to sue even when one cannot win. Bad court decisions must be challenged if they are to be overruled, but the early challenges are
certainly hopeless. The first attorney to challenge Plessy v. Ferguson was certainly
bringing a frivolous action, but his efforts and the efforts of others eventually led to
Brown v. Board of Education. Similarly, the apparently useless challenges by attorneys of the still relatively recent Supreme Court decision in Swain v. Alabama have
induced the Court quickly to reconsider and reject that ill-conceived ruling. (citation
omitted).
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settled law rejects the claim or defense in question and the pleader
offers no rational basis for distinguishing the case in question from
the ruling precedents.3

15

Challenges to the federal government's

power to tax income fall into this category.3 16 Sanctions are also appropriate where the claim is identical to one which the court has

previously dismissed against the same pleader, either in an earlier
phase of the case, or in previous actions between the same or related

parties.31 This situation frequently arises when the plaintiff, having
had his action dismissed in state court, sues in federal court on the
same grounds seeking a federal remedy.318 Similarly, sanctions may
be imposed where an attorney certifies a pleading which purports to
raise a new claim or defense, but which really presents arguments

identical to the ones that have been previously rejected.31 9
3. Mid-Spectrum

Conduct -

Presumptive Standards. -

315. See National Survival Game, Inc. v. Skirmish, U.S.A., Inc., 603 F. Supp. 339, 34243 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (plaintiff offered no cases in support of his position and ignored settled
law to contrary); Booker v. City of Atlanta, 586 F. Supp. 340, 341-42 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (sanctions were appropriate where counsel presented arguments rejected by a long, unbroken line of
authority); Aune v. United States, 582 F. Supp. 1132, 1136 (D. Ariz. 1984) (action challenging constitutionality of federal income tax laws), affd without opinion sub nom. Brasseur v.
United States, 765 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1985); Dore v. Schultz, 582 F. Supp. 154, 156-58
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (sanctions were appropriate where plaintiff brought an action for negligent
failure to enforce Immigration and Nationality Act, and "courts [had] repeatedly held that
the negligent enforcement of federal statutes and regulations does not automatically result in
governmental liability under the [Federal Tort Claims Act]").
316. See Fredrick v. Clark, 587 F. Supp. 789, 794 (W.D. Wis. 1984); Aune v. United
States, 582 F. Supp. 1132, 1136 (D. Ariz. 1984), affd without opinion sub nom. Brasseur v.
United States, 765 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1985).
317. See Cannon v. Loyola University, 784 F.2d 777, 782 (7th Cir. 1986) (court found
that plaintiff's claim was barred by res judicata and that her "ten year history of litigation
demonstrates her penchant for harassing the defendants"); Eastway I, 762 F.2d at 252 ("In
addressing the issue of attorneys' fees, we find it particularly noteworthy that Eastway had
already challenged the City's policy in the state courts, and had been unsuccessful."); Fried v.
Fried, 113 F.R.D. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (sanctions granted where claim had been conclusively
decided in previous action); Silverman v. Center, 603 F. Supp. 430, 431-32 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
(sanctions were awarded under Rule 11 where there had been prior state court action rendering the issue before court res judicata, and plaintiffs did not indicate this earlier proceeding in
application for an order to show cause, but instead submitted a conclusory letter stating that
this action was somehow "new and different"); Smith v. United Transp. Union Local No. 81,
594 F. Supp. 96, 100-01 (S.D. Cal. 1984) (counsel raised defenses previously stricken without
stating why they were now sufficient); United States ex reL U.S.-Namibia (Southwest Africa)
Trade & Cultural Council, Inc. v. Africa Fund, 588 F. Supp. 1350, 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(plaintiff repeatedly initiated groundless actions).
318. See Eastway 1, 762 F.2d at 252; Carrion v. Yeshiva Univ., 535 F.2d 722, 728 (2d
Cir. 1976); Silverman v. Center, 603 F. Supp. 430, 431-32 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
319. See Smith v. United Transp. Union Local No. 81, 594 F. Supp. 96, 100-01 (S.D.
Cal. 1984); United States ex reL U.S.-Namibia (Southwest Africa) Trade & Cultural Council, Inc., v. Africa Fund, 588 F. Supp. 1350, 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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a. Presumptively reasonable.- Although certain conduct falls very
close to the clearly reasonable end of the spectrum, it should be examined on a case by case basis. For example, novel theories of recovery, particularly those which rely on analogies to unrelated fields of
law, should be thoroughly scrutinized. Normally, such pleadings are
proper and will give rise to sanctions only upon a showing that they
are so far-fetched that they could only have been interposed for improper purposes. Similarly, the courts should hesitate before granting
sanctions when the pleading involves a complicated area of the law,
unless the adversary can show that the pleader's claim is merely a
smokescreen actually designed to harass the adversary.3 20
b. Presumptively unreasonable.- Certain conduct lies so near
the clearly unreasonable end of the spectrum that it gives rise to a
rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness. For instance, where the
pleader has misrepresented the governing law, sanctions are appropriate if the pleader was seeking to mislead the court.3 21 Sanctions
are not appropriate merely because a party misinterpreted the law
and ultimately proved unsuccessful in the action. Nor are sanctions
appropriate simply because a party has erred in describing the applicable law. However, where it can be shown that the pleader knew or
should have known the governing law, and the pleader subsequently
interposes a claim based on a standard other than the appropriate
standard, sanctions may be imposed.3 22
VI.

CONCLUSION

Since the 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective, the courts have exhibited a greater willingness to impose sanctions under Rule 11. Nevertheless, the cases have
been less than instructive on the precise obligations of attorneys
under the Rule 11 certification requirement. The bright line presumptions proposed in this Article provide a much needed element of
certainty to guide attorney conduct, and to help courts in deterring
frivolous litigation tactics without chilling legitimate claims.

320. See supra notes 218-20 and accompanying text.
321.

See, e.g., Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1542

(9th Cir. 1986) ("A lawyer should not be able to proceed with impunity in real or feigned
ignorance of authorities which render his argument meritless.").
322. See Smith v. United Transp. Union Local No. 81, 594 F. Supp. 96, 100-01 (S.D.
Cal. 1984); Huettig & Schromm, Inc. v. Landscape Contractors Council, 582 F. Supp. 1519,
1521-22 (N.D. Cal. 1984), afid, 790 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1986).
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